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1 
ARTICLES 
 
Smoking Out the Impact of 
Tobacco-Related Decisions on 
Public Health Law 
Micah L. Berman† 
Tobacco is a product—and public health problem—
unlike any other. No other legal consumable product is nearly 
as addictive or as deadly as the cigarette, which kills 
approximately 440,000 Americans every year.1 Moreover, 
tobacco products have exerted an unparalleled influence over 
American society and culture. As Allan Brandt wrote in The 
Cigarette Century, cigarettes have “deeply penetrated 
American culture,” leaving “few, if any, central aspects of 
American society that are truly smoke-free.”2 These and other 
characteristics make tobacco use a highly unusual public 
health issue, and therefore courts have often distorted 
precedents and shaped their decisions to accommodate the 
unique exigencies of tobacco-related cases. In turn, these 
decisions have significantly reshaped public health law 
doctrine, affecting a wide variety of health-related concerns 
outside the tobacco context. 
  
 † Assistant Professor, New England Law | Boston. An earlier version of this 
Article was presented at the 2008 Health Law Scholars Workshop at St. Louis 
University School of Law. Thanks to the participants in the workshop, especially 
Sidney Watson, Scott Burris, Rob Gatter, and Tim Greaney. Additional thanks to 
Elizabeth Leonard, Maggie Mahoney, Elizabeth Bloom, Lawrence Friedman, and the 
faculty of New England Law | Boston. 
 1 Rob Crane, The Most Addictive Drug, the Most Deadly Substance: Smoking 
Cessation Tactics for the Busy Clinician, 34 PRIMARY CARE CLINICAL OFF. PRAC. 117, 
117 (2007) (“By several measures, nicotine is the world’s most highly addictive drug, 
and tobacco is its most deadly substance.”). 
 2 ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY 3 (2007). 
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This Article seeks to uncover and analyze the role that 
tobacco-related litigation has played in the evolution of public 
health law doctrine. “Public health law” can be described as the 
application of administrative and tort law to the field of public 
health, subject to the limitations imposed by constitutional 
law.3 The past twenty-five years have seen substantial shifts in 
both the administrative and tort law aspects of public health 
law. In administrative law, the Supreme Court has “gradually 
erod[ed] the deference accorded to administrative agencies,” 
including public health entities.4 This retreat from the highly 
deferential rule announced in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.5 has had profound implications 
for the ability of regulatory agencies to proactively address 
public health challenges. At the same time, federal court 
decisions in personal injury and products liability cases have 
made it substantially more difficult for public health advocates 
to use tort law in ways that “influence and develop . . . policies 
directly affecting the public’s health.”6 
What role have tobacco-related cases played in these 
developments? Have these cases pushed public health law in 
particular directions? Or have tobacco-related decisions merely 
reflected broader cross-cutting trends? This Article suggests 
that while there have certainly been other factors concurrently 
driving the development of public health law, a broader 
perspective reveals that tobacco cases have had a considerable 
influence that has been generally unrecognized. In several 
different areas, doctrines developed or extended in tobacco-
related cases have engrained an anti-regulatory bias into 
  
 3 See generally Edward P. Richards, Public Health Law as Administrative 
Law: Example Lessons, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 61 (2007); Elizabeth A. Weeks, 
Beyond Compensation: Using Torts to Promote Public Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & 
POL’Y 27 (2007); Wendy E. Parmet, Public Health and Constitutional Law: Recognizing 
the Relationship, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 13 (2007). This Article will not explore 
the constitutional law aspects of public health law, though tobacco-related cases have 
played a substantial role in that field as well. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 
533 U.S. 525, 532 (2001) (exploring First Amendment limitations on the regulation of 
commercial speech). 
 4 Stephen M. Johnson, Bringing Deference Back (But for How Long?): Justice 
Alito, Chevron, Auer, and Chenery in the Supreme Court’s 2006 Term, 57 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 1, 1, 42-43 (2007) (suggesting that Justice Alito’s elevation to the Supreme Court 
created a modest shift back towards a more deferential view of agency decisions in the 
2006 Term). 
 5 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 6 Wendy E. Parmet, Tobacco, HIV, and the Courtroom: The Role of 
Affirmative Litigation in the Formation of Public Health Policy, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1663, 
1669 (1999). 
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public health law, and this has made it more difficult for 
plaintiffs seeking redress for other types of health-related 
injuries to have their cases heard in court. Overall, if it had not 
been for tobacco-related cases, today’s health-related litigation 
would likely encounter a markedly different legal landscape. 
Reconsidering the history of tobacco-related cases is important 
for understanding the dynamics of public health law’s evolution 
and the ways in which public health goals can (or cannot) be 
pursued through regulation and litigation. This, in turn, raises 
questions for legal scholars, judges, and public health experts 
alike as to how tobacco-related cases should be treated by the 
courts. 
Part I of this Article discusses whether tobacco cases are 
“exceptional,” and suggests several reasons why courts have 
approached smoking-related litigation differently from other 
public health cases. Part II reviews the impact of tobacco cases 
in the regulatory context, focusing on the wide-ranging impact 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp.7 There, the Court rejected the FDA’s jurisdiction 
over tobacco products, after struggling with what it termed 
tobacco’s “unique place in American history and society.”8 In 
the process of reaching this conclusion, the Court collapsed the 
two-part Chevron test into a one-step process that provided far 
less deference for administrative action. The impact of this 
decision has reached far beyond tobacco cases, limiting the 
ability of other regulatory agencies to addresses emerging 
public health concerns. Part III assesses the influence of 
tobacco cases on personal injury litigation and products 
liability lawsuits. This Part covers three primary subjects: 
preemption, class certification, and punitive damages. Part IV 
concludes the Article by raising the normative question of how 
the courts should have approached tobacco-related cases, and 
suggests that the courts’ failure to directly confront this 
question has allowed tobacco litigation to have a distorting 
impact on the rest of public health law. 
I. IS TOBACCO EXCEPTIONAL? 
As an initial matter, it may be necessary to explore the 
concept of uniqueness and disentangle two meanings of the 
  
 7 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 8 Id. at 159-60. 
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word “exceptionalism.” In various fields of law, scholars have 
argued that if a particular subject is “exceptional,” it must be 
subjected to a unique set of legal rules because the existing 
legal framework cannot accommodate it. For example, claims 
have been made that distinct legal structures (whether 
statutory or judicially developed) are needed to address modern 
phenomena such as the Internet, genomics, and 
nanotechnology.9 In the context of public health, Ronald Bayer 
argued in 1991 that despite the existence of a legal framework 
for combating communicable diseases, “HIV exceptionalism” 
had produced a unique set of laws to deal with the AIDS 
epidemic.10 
This Article will not explore that type of exceptionalism, 
i.e., whether a different legal framework is necessary to 
address the issue of tobacco. Tobacco products do have their 
own regulatory regime, which is clearly “exceptional” in the 
world of food and drug law.11 Though warning labels are 
required on cigarette packages by the Federal Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), “[c]igarettes have been 
specifically exempted from coverage under the Fair Labeling 
and Packaging Act of 1966, the Controlled Substances Act of 
  
 9 See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw 
Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999) (arguing that the “law of cyberspace” 
should be considered a distinct and specialized area of law); Lainie Friedman Ross, 
Genetic Exceptionalism vs. Paradigm Shift: Lessons from HIV, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
141 (2001) (considering, but ultimately rejecting, the arguments in favor of “genetic 
exceptionalism”); Frederick A. Fielder & Glenn H. Reynolds, Legal Problems of 
Nanotechnology: An Overview, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 593 (1994) (“Some of the 
problems posed by nanotechnology may be sui generis . . . and may therefore be 
addressable only through the creation of entirely new rules.”). 
 10 Ronald Bayer, Public Health Policy and the AIDS Epidemic: An End to 
HIV Exceptionalism?, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1500, 1501 (1991) (“[I]n the end, it was 
those who called for ‘HIV exceptionalism’ who came to dominate the public discourse.”). 
Scott Burris later responded that the response to HIV was better viewed as a typical 
response to a new public health threat. Scott Burris, Public Health, “AIDS 
Exceptionalism,” and the Law, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 251, 261 (1994) (“in other 
words, unique but not exceptional”). 
 11 After years of inaction, Congress recently passed the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, which for the first time grants the FDA limited 
authority to regulate cigarettes. See Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009); see also 
Jeff Zeleny, Occasional Smoker, 47, Signs Tobacco Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at 
A15. This 83-page law sets out an intricate and unique set of regulatory provisions that 
will govern the tobacco industry. The FDA’s authority over tobacco products is limited 
in several respects. Most notably, the FDA is prohibited from “(A) banning all 
cigarettes, all smokeless tobacco products, all little cigars, all cigars other than little 
cigars, all pipe tobacco, or all roll-your-own tobacco products; or (B) requiring the 
reduction of nicotine yields of a tobacco product to zero.” H.R. 1256, 111th Cong. 
§ 907(d)(3) (2009). The law also specifically states that it should not be read to 
“establish a precedent with regard to any other industry.” Id. § 4(a)(1). 
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1970, the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 (establishing 
the Consumer Product Safety Commission), and the Toxic 
Substances Act of 1976.”12 That Congress has chosen to regulate 
(or not regulate) tobacco differently from other public health 
concerns has certainly had implications for tobacco-related 
litigation, as discussed below. But whether such unique 
treatment by Congress is itself warranted or unwarranted is a 
policy debate beyond the scope of this Article. 
Rather, this Article suggests that tobacco cases are 
treated in an “exceptional” manner by the courts, and that such 
treatment has had a distorting effect on judicial decision-
making in the field of public health. Courts purport to apply 
the same legal doctrine to tobacco cases that they apply to all 
other public health issues, and they do so in a facially neutral 
way. In actuality, however, courts tend to be unusually 
skeptical of attempts to regulate tobacco and of plaintiffs’ 
claims against the tobacco industry. Because tobacco-related 
cases then stand as precedent for other public health cases, 
this legal “exceptionalism” exerts a significant influence on the 
overall direction of public health law. 
By analogy, scholars have noted a similar phenomenon 
in the field of criminal procedure, where courts purport to 
apply the Fourth Amendment in a facially neutral way, but 
seem to operate with less concern for privacy interests when 
illegal drugs are involved.13 Limiting Fourth Amendment rights 
in drug cases then has a distorting impact on Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence more generally, leading to 
weakened privacy protections for defendants even when illegal 
drugs are not involved. Although there are surely other factors 
beyond the “war on drugs” that have led the Supreme Court 
towards a more pro-prosecution posture in Fourth Amendment 
cases, scholars have persuasively argued that the unique 
exigencies of drug cases have played a significant role in 
shaping the law. 
  
 12 Peter D. Jacobson & Kenneth E. Warner, Litigation and Public Health Policy 
Making: The Case of Tobacco Control, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 769, 774 (1999). 
 13 Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 766-72 (2002) 
(suggesting as possible explanations for this phenomenon the “sheer magnitude of drug 
crime and enforcement activities” and the “substantial personal and professional 
pressures of any given judge” to support the government’s efforts to combat illegal 
drugs); see also Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the 
Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 926 (1987) (predicting that dangerous precedents 
developed in drug prosecutions would inevitably “spill over to other areas of law”).  
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Similarly, as discussed below, courts purport to apply 
existing legal doctrine to tobacco cases, but the results in key 
cases have departed from prior precedent in significant ways. 
Just as illegal drug cases have played a prominent role in 
reshaping Fourth Amendment doctrine, tobacco cases have 
facilitated or furthered broader changes in the contours of 
public health law doctrine for all future cases—even when 
tobacco is not involved. 
But what is it about tobacco cases that causes courts to 
approach these cases differently? Though this is by no means 
an exhaustive list, tobacco’s unique history, the volume of 
tobacco litigation, and the saliency of the cultural and economic 
issues involved have all been significant factors. 
A. History and Entrenchment in Society 
Although many people assume that cigarettes have been 
popular for centuries, it was not until the early Twentieth 
Century that the cigarette rolling machine was invented, 
allowing tobacco companies to mass produce and mass market 
cigarettes. Cigarettes soon became hugely popular, helped in 
part by the distribution of free cigarettes to U.S. soldiers in 
World War II.14 By the early 1950s, when the first credible 
reports of the link between smoking and cancer were published 
in medical journals, “[n]early one out of two Americans could be 
counted as a regular smoker.”15 
The rapid growth of the industry was impressive, but it 
was the industry’s response to revelations of the cigarette’s 
dangers that set its history on a unique course. Instead of 
removing the product from the market or providing explicit 
warnings to consumers, the tobacco companies chose a third 
option—a cover-up. With the help of a public relations firm, 
Hill & Knowlton, the industry began its fifty-year campaign to 
deceive the public about the health effects of smoking.16 As 
  
 14 Deb Reichmann, Military Encounters Resistance to Proposed Ban on 
Smoking, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 30, 2009, at 4 (“Soldiers got cigarettes in their C-
rations during World War II.”). 
 15 Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 853, 855 (1992) [hereinafter Rabin, Sociolegal History]. 
 16 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some 
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1483-87 (1999) 
(summarizing Hill & Knowlton’s involvement in the “extraordinary decades-long 
campaign of the [cigarette] industry, acting in concert, to foster and perpetuate 
‘controversy’ over whether cigarettes cause disease”). 
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Judge Kessler summarized in United States v. Philip Morris 
USA, Inc.: 
From at least 1953 until at least 2000, [the cigarette manufacturers] 
repeatedly, consistently, vigorously—and falsely—denied the 
existence of any adverse health effects from smoking. Moreover, they 
mounted a coordinated, well-financed, sophisticated public relations 
campaign to attack and distort the scientific evidence demonstrating 
the relationship between smoking and disease, claiming that the link 
between the two was still an “open question.” Finally, in doing so, 
they ignored the massive documentation in their internal corporate 
files from their own scientists, executives, and public relations 
people that, as Philip Morris’s Vice President of Research and 
Development, Helmut Wakeham, admitted, there was “little basis 
for disputing the findings [of the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report 
concluding that smoking causes lung cancer].”17 
Although manufacturers of other products have delayed 
reporting known dangers of their products, the scope and 
duration of the tobacco industry’s campaign of deception stands 
alone. The success of this fraudulent campaign had substantial 
legal implications, as the tobacco companies were able to 
successfully argue in court for decades that cigarettes did not 
cause cancer (or, in each specific case, that cigarettes had not 
caused the plaintiff’s cancer).18 By the time that defense was no 
longer tenable, the tobacco companies were able to pivot—
amazingly, without conceding the connection between smoking 
and disease—to the defense that the plaintiff’s own decision to 
smoke (in light of the “common knowledge” that smoking 
causes disease) should absolve the companies of any 
responsibility.19 
The tobacco companies, however, were not able to fully 
escape legal liability. Most notably, the tobacco companies 
signed the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) in 1998, 
committing themselves to paying more than $200 billion to 
state governments.20 Although the MSA (and the avalanche of 
document disclosures that both preceded and followed the 
  
 17 United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 208 (D.D.C. 
2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 566 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 18 See infra Part III.B. 
 19 At times, the industry attempted to assert these two arguments 
simultaneously: “Its lawyers and executives would deny that there was any proof that 
cigarettes caused cancer. At the same time, they maintained that anyone . . . who chose 
to smoke assumed the risk of getting such a disease.” MICHAEL OREY, ASSUMING THE 
RISK 49 (1999). 
 20 Master Settlement Agreement 1-2, 44-45 (1998), available at 
http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/. 
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agreement) wounded the tobacco industry’s reputation, it 
permitted the industry to continue operating and it provided a 
measure of immunity from state-initiated lawsuits. It also 
provided some amount of protection from private lawsuits, as 
the industry was later able to argue in court that the MSA had 
forced it to fully account for its past misdeeds and reform its 
conduct.21 
Looking at this history as a whole, the continued 
existence of tobacco in the marketplace can be seen as a 
historical accident. As Thomas Merrill has written, “If 
cigarettes were introduced today, knowing what we know about 
them as a product, there is little doubt that they would be 
banned.”22 (This is in contrast to other public health concerns 
such as firearms and alcohol, where the risk/benefit trade-off 
has been more or less apparent for centuries.) However, 
because the cigarette became so deeply engrained in American 
society before its dangers were acknowledged—and because 
roughly 45 million Americans remain addicted to cigarettes—
prohibition is not seen as an attractive or realistic policy 
option.23 Thus, tobacco remains a legal product, but one that 
poses unique challenges for the courts and public health 
regulators because of its entrenchment in society and the 
massive number of people addicted to this highly dangerous 
product. 
B. Volume of Litigation 
Both the scope of the devastation caused by tobacco 
products and the profitability of the industry made it a 
uniquely appealing target for plaintiffs’ attorneys. In addition, 
the fact that tobacco products, despite their enormous death 
  
 21 See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549, 550-
51, 553-54 (Ga. 2006) (holding that private plaintiffs could not seek punitive damages 
from Brown & Williamson because the MSA had vindicated the state’s interest in 
punishing the tobacco companies). Provisions which would have explicitly limited the 
tobacco companies’ liability were included in earlier versions of the agreement, but not 
the final draft of the MSA. 
 22 Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting, 
Purchasing, and Possibly Condemning Tobacco Advertising, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1143, 
1203 (1999). 
 23 See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of Faith: Tobacco and the Madisonian 
Democracy, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 433, 435 (2000) (“While various contemporary 
leaders . . . have denounced tobacco as a leading killer of Americans, there has been no 
call from the White House or Congress to ban the product.”). For an argument in favor 
of gradually phasing out cigarettes, see Richard A. Daynard, Doing the Unthinkable 
(and Saving Millions of Lives), 18 TOBACCO CONTROL 2 (2009). 
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toll, were uniquely unregulated, led public health advocates to 
turn to the courts as an alternative channel through which to 
impose limits on the industry.24 In some cases, the goal was 
compensation for injured clients, while in others, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys sought to use litigation to “get [the tobacco 
companies] out of business.”25 
These efforts by plaintiffs’ attorneys confronted a 
“scorched earth” litigation strategy by the tobacco industry that 
was “unique in the annals of tort litigation.”26 As Sara Guardino 
and Richard Daynard write, “The industry’s success in the 
litigation [was] primarily because at the outset a decision was 
made to fight the lawsuits all out, never considering settlement 
in even the smallest sum.”27 This strategy set the industry 
apart from most other defendants: 
[I]n mass tort litigation—that is, litigation involving a huge number 
of claims arising out of a single hazardous course of conduct or event, 
such as the asbestos, Dalkon Shield, and DES cases—there has 
always come a point when the beleaguered defense has decided that 
at least some of the persistently arising claims are worth settling. By 
contrast, over a period of thirty-five years, the tobacco industry 
never offered to settle a single case.28 
The collision of aggressive litigation against the tobacco 
industry and the no-compromise strategy adopted by the 
defendants has meant that more smoking-related cases have 
been (and will continue to be) brought to trial, in comparison to 
cases dealing with other public health concerns. This is 
especially true given the length of time that cigarettes have 
been on the market and the millions of Americans with 
potential legal claims. Compare, for example, the recent 
litigation over Merck’s pain reliever Vioxx. When it became 
clear that there was a connection between Vioxx use and heart 
attacks, Merck was hit with a flood of thousands of lawsuits. 
After litigating fewer than twenty cases to trial, Merck agreed 
  
 24 See BRANDT, supra note 2, at 439 (“Attempts to regulate the tobacco 
industry had usually—when they yielded any results at all—ended in legislation that 
protected the industry from regulation. The resort to litigation grew out of these long-
standing failures of political and regulatory efforts.”). 
 25 See, e.g., CBS This Morning: Florida Lawyer Launches Attack on Several 
Major Tobacco Companies (CBS television broadcast Aug. 26, 1996) (interviewing 
plaintiffs’ attorney Stanley Rosenblatt).  
 26 Rabin, Sociolegal History, supra note 15, at 857. 
 27 Sara D. Guardino & Richard Daynard, Punishing Tobacco Industry 
Misconduct: The Case for Exceeding a Single Digit Ratio Between Punitive and 
Compensatory Damages, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 39 (2005). 
 28 Rabin, Sociolegal History, supra note 15, at 857-58. 
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to a massive $4.85 billion settlement that resolved more than 
26,000 claims at once.29 As Merck no longer sells Vioxx, having 
withdrawn it from the market in 2004,30 the settlement seems 
to have effectively ended litigation over the drug. The decision 
to settle was thus a logical business calculation, despite the 
existence of viable defenses. By contrast, Cliff Douglas et al. 
report that at least seventy-five smoking-related cases were 
tried to a verdict between 1995 and 2005, while nearly 3000 
individual actions are still pending.31 Since cigarettes, unlike 
Vioxx, remain on the market, and since there are literally 
millions of plaintiffs who could have similar claims, the tobacco 
companies are strongly predisposed against settling or 
conceding liability in any of these cases (which is, similarly, a 
logical business decision). The trajectory of the Vioxx 
litigation—a short-term outburst of cases followed by 
settlement of most claims—appears to be the more common 
pattern for public-health related claims. Yet it is the steady 
flow of tobacco-related cases that continues to produce more 
trials, more appeals, and ultimately more case law.32  
This high volume of litigation is a direct result of the 
uniqueness of tobacco as a product. Whereas other dangerous 
products have been either banned by regulators (lead paint, 
DDT, thalidomide) or litigated out of business (asbestos), 
  
 29 Vioxx Settlement Agreement 1-2 (2007), available at 
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/Settlement_Agreement.pdf; Press Release, 
Merck & Co., Inc., Merck Agreement to Resolve U.S. VIOXX Product Liability Lawsuits 
(Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/press_releases/corporate/ 
2007_1109_print.html. 
 30 Marc Kaufman, Merck Withdraws Arthritis Medication, WASH. POST., Oct. 
1, 2004, at A1. 
 31 Clifford E. Douglas et al., Epidemiology of the Third Wave of Tobacco 
Litigation in the United States, 1994-2005, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL (Supp. IV) iv9, iv11-
12 (2006). Thousands more individual cases have since been filed in Florida, following 
the decertification of the Engle v. Liggette Group, Inc. class action. Stephen Hudak, 
Smokers Crowd Court to Sue Big Tobacco, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 11, 2008, at A1 
(citing projections that as many as 10,000 individuals may file individual lawsuits). In 
Engle, the Florida Supreme Court decertified a massive smoking-related class action 
following a jury verdict for the plaintiff class. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 
1256, 1268 (Fla. 2006); see also infra text accompanying note 194. In decertifying the 
class, the Florida Supreme Court held that factual findings made by the Engle jury 
would be given res judicata effect in future individual lawsuits. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 
1269. 
 32 The tobacco industry’s pattern of appealing each adverse verdict until it 
receives a more favorable ruling has resulted in more precedential law being 
established in the context of tobacco claims, with the vast majority of these cases 
leaning in industry’s direction. Douglas et al. found that that of the thirty-one jury 
verdicts that plaintiffs won in litigation against tobacco companies between 1995 and 
2005, all of them were appealed. In only three cases was the initial jury verdict upheld 
and the defendant ordered to pay the plaintiff. Douglas, supra note 31, at iv12 tbl. 2. 
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tobacco remains on the market despite its status as the leading 
cause of preventable death. With some dangerous products, 
such as firearms, Congress has made the policy decision to 
prohibit most litigation against the industry.33 But with 
Congress unwilling to either ban tobacco litigation or ban the 
product, the steady drumbeat of tobacco litigation is set to 
continue indefinitely.34 
C. Cultural & Economic Significance 
Although cultural and economic pressures frame the 
background in all legal proceedings, these pressures have been 
particularly acute in the case of tobacco litigation. At the time 
the first medical studies linking smoking to cancer emerged in 
the mid-1950s, “cigarette smoking rivaled baseball as 
America’s national pastime.”35 “The cigarette was a cultural 
icon in Western society—tobacco smoking was viewed as chic, 
promoted ubiquitously, and portrayed by sports and movie 
stars as an accoutrement of the good life.”36 Although the allure 
of smoking gradually declined as the health effects of smoking 
were revealed, the industry has worked hard to maintain the 
cigarette’s status as a cultural icon, spending more than $15 
billion a year in advertising in the U.S. alone.37 
Perhaps due in part to this unique history, tobacco 
litigation has sparked intense debate—both inside and outside 
the courtroom—about the role of government in regulating 
individual conduct. Tobacco lawsuits have become the stage for 
  
 33 See, e.g., Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-
7903 (2006) (prohibiting, with limited exceptions, “a civil action or proceeding or an 
administrative proceeding brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of 
[firearms or ammunition], or a trade association, for damages, punitive damages, 
injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines, or penalties, or other 
relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a [firearm or ammunition] by 
the person or a third party”). 
 34 It has yet to be seen whether Congress’s recent enactment of the Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act will at all alter this dynamic. The law 
does not ban tobacco products, see supra note 11, nor does it bar further litigation 
against the tobacco industry. See, e.g., H.R. 1256, 111th Cong. § 916(b) (2009) (“No 
provision of this chapter relating to a tobacco product shall be construed to modify or 
otherwise affect any action or the liability of any person under the product liability law 
of any State.”).  
 35 Robert A. Kagan & William P. Nelson, The Politics of Tobacco Regulation 
in the United States, in REGULATING TOBACCO 11, 11 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. 
Sugarman eds., 2001). 
 36 Lawrence O. Gostin, Global Regulatory Strategies for Tobacco Control, 298 
J. AM. MED. ASSN. 2057, 2057 (2007). 
 37 JUDITH MACKAY ET AL., THE TOBACCO ATLAS 60 (2d ed. 2006). 
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“morality play[s], with judges and juries responsible for 
scripting which party is most deserving of blame.”38 The tobacco 
industry has worked to “reframe[] tobacco from a public health 
problem to an issue of individual choice . . . tap[ping] into 
American ideals of individual freedom, and in turn portray[ing] 
public health advocates as extremists who support government 
intrusion into private decision making.”39 These efforts have 
made tobacco litigation a socially contentious issue, as much 
about preserving “free choice and personal responsibility” as 
about the industry’s misconduct.40  
Although issues of personal choice and individual 
responsibility are central to many public health threats (drug 
addiction, sexually transmitted disease, etc.), only tobacco 
litigation has seen this subject intensely litigated in the 
courtroom.41 Some have suggested that food-related litigation, 
which clearly implicates the issue of personal responsibility, is 
“the next tobacco.”42 Obesity-related lawsuits, however, face 
numerous challenges and thus far have not been legally 
significant.43 
Economic pressures are also a significant—though 
somewhat less unique—feature of tobacco litigation. In 
Barbarians at the Gate, Warren Buffet was quoted as saying, 
“I’ll tell you why I like the cigarette business . . . . It costs a 
penny to make. Sell it for a dollar. It’s addictive. And there’s 
  
 38 Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play’s Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, 
Fraud and Consumer Choice in “Third Wave” Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 
465, 465 (1998). 
 39 P.A. McDaniel & R.E. Malone, Understanding Philip Morris’s Pursuit of 
U.S. Government Regulation of Tobacco, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 193, 197 (2005). For a 
recent example, see Lorrilard Tobacco Company’s efforts to prevent Congress from 
regulating menthol cigarettes. Menthol Choice, http://www.mentholchoice.com/ (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2009) (“Freedom of choice isn’t a privilege. It’s a right. But unless you 
speak up, you may not have the right to choose menthol cigarettes for much longer. 
Legislators are being pushed by some self-appointed activists to ban all menthol 
cigarettes. . . . Speak now . . . [o]r run the risk of starting a trend that may end up with 
all of us having fewer rights to choose.”). 
 40 See Kagan & Nelson, supra note 35, at 32 (“By appealing to values of free 
choice and personal responsibility, the tobacco industry has been largely able to deflect 
potentially devastating lawsuits and perhaps helped dampen public support for higher 
taxes.”). 
 41 In illegal drug cases, for example, there is no legal industry that can be sued. 
 42 See, e.g., Roger Parloff, Is Fat the Next Tobacco?, FORTUNE, Feb. 3, 2003, at 50. 
 43 See Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 404 (2008) 
(“No plaintiff has ever prevailed at trial on an obesity claim alleging common law fraud 
or negligence, and it is uncertain whether anyone ever will in light of the problems of 
pleading and proof attendant to a suit pursued under those theories.”). For example, 
although causation can be a significant hurdle in tobacco cases, causation would be far 
more complex—if not impossible—to establish in an obesity-focused lawsuit. 
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fantastic brand loyalty.”44 Although taxes and inflation have 
increased the price of cigarettes, that fundamental equation 
remains true. Despite having to pay billions in settlement 
payments to the states, the major tobacco companies remain 
extremely profitable. Altria (the parent company of Philip 
Morris) is by far the largest U.S. tobacco company, with $70 
billion in revenue and nearly $10 billion in profits in 2007.45 
Other companies like R.J. Reynolds and Lorillard, though 
much smaller, are still multi-billion dollar businesses and 
substantial employers.46 As tobacco companies are such an 
integral part of corporate America, both courts and legislatures 
have at times expressed their concerns that curtailing or 
eliminating the tobacco industry could have destabilizing 
effects on the entire national economy.47 
The cultural and economic prominence of tobacco has 
loomed over tobacco litigation, leading many judges to assume 
that any decision adverse to the tobacco industry defendant 
may have severe cultural and economic ramifications. 
Consequently, the safe, risk-averse path is the one that 
protects the industry from liability. For example, in FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson the Supreme Court referenced both 
tobacco’s “unique place in American history and society” and its 
status as a “significant portion of the American economy” in 
concluding that the Food and Drug Administration did not 
have the authority to regulate tobacco.48 The Court repeatedly 
emphasized that tobacco is not just another product; it is a 
product of unparalleled cultural and economic significance. 
These factors—the pervasiveness of tobacco in society, 
the sheer volume of tobacco litigation, and the cultural and 
  
 44 BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL 
OF RJR NABISCO 218 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45 John Reid Blackwell, Altria Moves Headquarters from N.Y. to Va. Today: 
Shift to Henrico Helps Area Keep Fortune 500/1000 Presence Here on an Even Keel, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 31, 2008, at A1; see also The Fortune 500’s Biggest 
Winners: 15. Altria Group, FORTUNE, http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2008/fortune/ 
0804/gallery.most_profitable.fortune/15.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2009). 
 46 See CNNMoney.com, Lorillard Inc. Company Profile, http://money.cnn.com/ 
quote/snapshot/snapshot.html?symb=LO (last visited Sept. 21, 2009); CNNMoney.com, 
Reynolds American Inc. Company Profile, http://money.cnn.com/quote/snapshot/ 
snapshot.html?symb=RAI (last visited Sept. 21, 2009). 
 47 See infra note 77 and accompanying text; see also Yussuf Saloojee & Elif 
Dagli, Tobacco Industry Tactics for Resisting Public Policy on Health, 78 BULL. WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. 902, 905 (2000) (quoting a Philip Morris executive as stating that 
“[e]conomic contribution arguments form the cornerstone of tobacco industry public 
affairs”). 
 48 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). 
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economic significance of the industry—may explain why 
tobacco cases have seemingly diverged from prior case law.49 
Moreover, the intensity with which tobacco cases have been 
litigated helps account for why tobacco cases have been so 
influential in the subsequent development of public health law. 
The following sections explore these developments, 
focusing on (1) the creation of new doctrine in the context of 
tobacco cases, and (2) the subsequent impact of these decisions 
on public health law doctrine. While the “exceptionalism” of 
tobacco has not been the sole factor causing these various areas 
of public health law to evolve, it is clearly significant that 
tobacco cases have played a prominent and consistent role in 
the development of several different doctrinal fields of public 
health law. 
II. TOBACCO LITIGATION AND REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
Much of public health law is administrative law. At the 
federal level, an alphabet soup of regulatory agencies and 
cabinet departments—the FDA, CDC, OSHA, EPA, USDA—
have the primary responsibility for ensuring that we have safe 
workplaces, healthy (or at least nontoxic) food, rigorously-
tested pharmaceuticals, and coordinated responses to chronic 
and infectious diseases. At the state level, local and state 
health departments do the day-to-day work of enforcing food 
and sanitation codes, conducting safety inspections, controlling 
infectious diseases, and, in many cases, providing preventive 
health services. 
At both the federal and the state level, regulatory 
agencies derive their powers from the legislature, and their 
authority is limited by statute.50 Delegations of power relating 
to public health, however, have tended to be quite broad and 
liberally construed.51 For example, the Massachusetts General 
  
 49 This is not intended to be an exhaustive list; there may be other factors 
that account for the unique manner in which tobacco has received in the courts. For 
example, at the state court level, an additional factor may be campaign contributions 
by the tobacco companies to elected judges. See, e.g., Kevin McDermott, Donations 
Complicate Philip Morris Tobacco Suit, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 18, 2005, at 
D1.  
 50 Peter D. Jacobson & Richard E. Hoffman, Regulating Public Health: 
Principles and Applications of Administrative Law, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH 
PRACTICE 23, 25 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2002). 
 51 See, e.g., Columbia v. Bd. of Health & Envtl. Control, 355 S.E.2d 536, 538 
(S.C. 1987) (“The delegation of authority to an administrative agency is construed 
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Laws provide that “[b]oards of health may make reasonable 
health regulations,”52 and this expansive provision has been 
interpreted to mean that “boards of health [have] plenary 
power to issue reasonable, general health regulations.”53 
Similarly, at the federal level, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the FDA “has been delegated broad discretion 
by Congress in any number of areas” relating to the regulation 
of food and drugs.54 Such broad delegations of power are 
deemed necessary because public health authorities may be 
called upon to respond to “unanticipated and rapidly emerging 
needs and threats.”55 
Indeed, because of changes in science, medicine, and 
society, the major public health concerns of today bear little 
resemblance to the primary public health concerns of a century 
ago. Broad delegations of power have allowed public health 
authorities to refocus their missions to address new and 
unexpected public health needs. The Massachusetts statute 
quoted above has remained more or less unchanged since 1816, 
despite the fact that the 1816 legislature could not possibly 
have imagined the issues boards of health confront today—
West Nile Virus, lead paint exposure, childhood obesity, 
bioterrorism preparedness, and others. 
In the 1990s, however, when the FDA and state 
regulatory agencies attempted to use their broadly-worded 
regulatory authority to address tobacco-related harms, the 
tobacco industry fought back in court. The resulting decisions 
set new precedents that undermined the ability of regulators to 
respond to emerging public health threats. 
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court 
blocked the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from 
exerting regulatory authority over the tobacco industry, and in 
the process restricted the amount of deference provided to 
public health authorities.56 In that case, the Court developed 
new rules for statutory interpretation that gave future courts 
greater flexibility to strike down public health regulations in 
  
liberally when the agency is concerned with the protection of the health and welfare of 
the public.”); see also 39 AM. JUR. 2D, Health § 39, n.81 (2008) (collecting cases).  
 52 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 31 (2008). 
 53 Tri-Nel Mgmt. v. Bd. of Health, 741 N.E.2d 37, 42 (Mass. 2001). 
 54 See Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986). 
 55 Sara Rosenbaum et al., New Models for Prevention Systems: Public Health 
Emergencies and the Public Health/Managed Care Challenge, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 
63, 64 (2002). 
 56 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
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non-tobacco settings. In particular, the Court collapsed the 
two-part Chevron test into one step by using the statute’s 
“context” to conclude that the statute in question did not 
contain any ambiguity.57 By addressing the issue this way, the 
Court was able to circumvent Chevron’s far more deferential 
second step. Although the Supreme Court’s decision was likely 
driven by the cultural and economic importance of tobacco, this 
legal mechanism developed in Brown & Williamson was later 
used to strike down public health regulations in other fields. 
A. FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
In 1996, the FDA, for the first time in its history, 
promulgated rules “concerning tobacco products’ promotion, 
labeling, and accessibility to children and adolescents.”58 The 
FDA based this departure from previous practice—the FDA 
had previously stated that it lacked authority to regulate 
tobacco products59—on new revelations that the tobacco 
companies were fully aware of the addictive properties of 
nicotine and had in fact manipulated nicotine levels in tobacco 
products in order to create and sustain addiction.60 The text of 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) provided the FDA 
with broad authority to regulate “drugs” and “devices” that 
were “intended to affect the structure or any function of the 
body.”61 Following a year-long investigation, the FDA concluded 
that nicotine was a “drug” and that cigarettes and smokeless 
tobacco products were “drug delivery devices” subject to the 
FDA’s jurisdiction.62 Several tobacco companies immediately 
filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
North Carolina. 
Given the plain language of the statute and the FDA’s 
extensive investigative work, it appeared the FDA had a strong 
argument.63 Its position was seemingly bolstered by the 
  
 57 See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text. 
 58 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 128. 
 59 Id. at 146-56 (quoting various statements from FDA officials that the FDA 
lacked authority to regulate tobacco products). 
 60 See William B. Schultz, The FDA’s Decision to Regulate Tobacco Products, 
18 PACE L. REV. 27, 28-34 (1997). 
 61 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)-(h) 
(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 62 See generally DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT (2001) (discussing 
the FDA’s decision to assert authority to regulate tobacco products). 
 63 See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as 
Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1028 (1998) (“[T]he natural reading of the 
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Chevron doctrine that the Supreme Court used (and still uses) 
to analyze an administrative agency’s construction of its 
authorizing statute.64 Pursuant to the Chevron doctrine, if 
Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” 
the agency must “give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.”65 However, “if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for 
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”66 This doctrine—also 
known as “Chevron deference”—was intended to give 
administrative agencies wide latitude in interpreting enabling 
statutes. The Court was clear in Chevron that “a court may not 
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an 
agency.”67 
Despite the plain language of the statute and the 
Chevron doctrine’s deference towards agency rulemaking, the 
Court concluded in a 5-4 ruling that the FDA lacked authority 
to regulate tobacco products.68 Although the statute said 
nothing explicitly about whether tobacco could be characterized 
as a “drug delivery device” (in contrast to numerous other 
federal statutes that expressly exempted tobacco products from 
their scope), the Court nonetheless found that Congress had 
“directly spoken” to the issue and precluded FDA regulation.69 
Instead of reviewing whether the statute was 
“ambiguous” and, if so, whether the FDA’s construction of the 
statute was “permissible,” the Court collapsed these two steps 
into one and conducted its own investigation into the 
“contextual” meaning of the FDCA’s terms. It first reviewed the 
structure of the FDCA and concluded that “if tobacco products 
were ‘devices’ under the FDCA, the FDA would be required to 
remove them from the market.”70 While perhaps a plausible 
  
text appears to be strongly supportive of the FDA. It suggests not ambiguity but a 
relatively clear understanding like that of the current FDA.”). 
 64 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 
842-44 (1984). 
 65 Id. at 842-43. 
 66 Id. at 843. 
 67 Id. at 844. The Chevron test “appears to call for a large degree of judicial 
deference to agency interpretations.” Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges 
Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
823, 824 (2006). 
 68 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000). 
 69 Id. at 160-61. 
 70 Id. at 135. 
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reading of the FDCA, the FDA had considered and rejected this 
interpretation of the FDCA during its rulemaking process. It 
had instead concluded that “the record does not establish 
that . . . a ban is the appropriate public health response under 
the [FDCA]” and that the FDCA allowed the agency to adopt 
regulatory restrictions short of an outright ban.71 Rather than 
view this provision of the statute as ambiguous and then 
consider whether the FDA’s interpretation of the statute was 
reasonable, the Court substituted its own interpretation of the 
statute for the FDA’s.72  
Although the FDA had not attempted to ban tobacco 
products, the Court then used its first conclusion (if the FDA 
had authority to regulate tobacco products, it would have to 
remove them from the market) as the starting point for its 
subsequent analysis. It then concluded that because Congress 
had made several statements in other statutes implicitly 
suggesting that tobacco products would remain available for 
sale, it could not have intended for the FDA to ban tobacco 
products. Thus, Congress had “spoken directly to the FDA’s 
authority to regulate tobacco” and denied it such authority.73  
Contextual clues—in this case, subsequent 
congressional actions regarding tobacco—would surely have 
been relevant for determining whether the FDA’s application of 
the FDCA was “reasonable.” The Court, however, used its 
questionable analysis of the statute’s context in order to 
conclude that the statute itself was unambiguous with respect 
to the FDA’s authority to regulate tobacco. In essence, it read 
the patent ambiguity out of the statute instead of deferentially 
reviewing whether the FDA’s application of the statute was 
“reasonable.”74 Rather than employing the two-step Chevron 
test, the Court collapsed the Chevron analysis into a one-step 
  
 71 Id. at 139. 
 72 For a forceful argument that the FDCA did permit the FDA to take 
remedial action short of a complete ban of cigarettes, see id. at 174-81 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 73 Id. at 143-44 (majority opinion). 
 74 Beyond the Court’s problematic restructuring of the Chevron test, its 
decision ran contrary to the general scheme of public health law, which typically 
provides regulatory agencies with broad authority to address new public health 
threats. Writing in a different administrative law context, Justice Stevens wrote that 
the Court should be particularly deferential to agency interpretations “in a statutory 
regime so obviously meant to maximize administrative flexibility.” MCI Telecom. Corp. 
v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 244 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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“contextual” reading that allowed it to avoid a more deferential 
review of the agency’s action.75  
The Court’s sleight of hand was legally questionable, 
but it seems to have reflected the majority’s point of view that 
tobacco products were simply different. It is hardly unusual for 
regulatory agencies to assert jurisdiction over new products or 
activities when new facts warrant it, and prior to Brown & 
Williamson those extensions of regulatory oversight were 
generally upheld. For example, consider Cass Sunstein’s 
discussion of the regulation of DDT: 
[I]t is generally agreed that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) authorizes the EPA to regulate DDT as a 
product raising “a substantial question” of human safety, but that 
this authority does not rest on a judgment that the Congress that 
enacted FIFRA believed that the EPA could regulate DDT. On the 
contrary, when introduced, DDT was thought to be unproblematic 
and entirely safe, and hence the enacting Congress did not 
contemplate that FIFRA would authorize EPA regulation of DDT. 
The EPA nevertheless possesses just such authority. Statutes 
regulating health and safety quite routinely contain broad language 
authorizing agencies to regulate articles or substances if the 
statutory criteria are met. Whether Congress believed that the 
statutory criteria were met when it enacted the relevant legislation 
is beside the point unless Congress embodied that belief in law.76  
In Brown & Williamson, however, the majority went out 
of its way to emphasize the uniqueness of tobacco. It wrote: 
This is hardly an ordinary case. Contrary to its representations to 
Congress since 1914, the FDA has now asserted jurisdiction to 
regulate an industry constituting a significant portion of the 
American economy . . . . Owing to its unique place in American 
  
 75 Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule argue that Chevron’s inquiry is 
really only one step and that the distinction between the two steps has always been 
artificial. See Matthew Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 
95 VA. L. REV. 597, 597 (2009). They claim that “[t]he single question is whether the 
agency’s construction is permissible as a matter of statutory interpretation.” Id. at 599. 
Thus, while Brown & Williamson was decided under Step One, they write that “[i]t 
would have been equally easy . . . for the Court to find under Step One that the full 
scope of the FDA’s statutory jurisdiction is ambiguous . . . but to declare that the FDA’s 
assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco products was unreasonable under Chevron Step 
Two.” Id. at 599-600. In my view, this analysis misses the mark. While the question 
asked under the two steps may be similar, the deference with which the question is 
approached is not. If the Court construes the statue to have a narrow meaning under 
Step One, it need not provide deference to the agency’s interpretation. In Brown & 
Williamson, had the Court conceded that there was ambiguity in the statue, it would 
have been nearly impossibly to find that the FDA was not “reasonable” in concluding 
that tobacco met the statutory definition. That is why the Court labored so hard to 
force its analysis into Step One. 
 76 Sunstein, supra note 63, at 1030-31. 
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history and society, tobacco has its own unique political history . . . . 
[W]e are confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate 
a decision of such economic and political significance to an agency in 
so cryptic a fashion.77 
Perhaps driven by the political salience of the tobacco 
issue, the Brown & Williamson case also caused several 
justices to depart from their typical approach to administrative 
cases. The Court’s most ardent textualists—Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas—joined an opinion that avoided addressing the 
plain meaning of the text and instead looked carefully at post-
enactment Congressional actions.78 Meanwhile, the majority 
opinion made a point of noting that Justice Breyer—author of 
the dissenting opinion—had previously written a law review 
article suggesting that judges should be more hesitant to find a 
broad delegation of authority to an administrative agency when 
“the legal question is an important one.”79 
The majority was of course correct that tobacco 
presented a unique case. As discussed above, tobacco has 
certainly had its own “political history” and a powerful 
influence on American society.80 The majority clearly felt that 
tobacco regulation was not just a new application of broad 
regulatory authority, but instead that tobacco (even if it were 
to be considered a “drug delivery device”) was somehow 
different, deserving of an implied exception to the statute’s 
broad language.  
The majority’s conclusion can also been seen as an 
example of inter-branch communication that addressed 
unstated political tensions. According to Jonathan Turley, the 
Court’s decision is better read as a response to the FDA’s 
attempt to circumvent Congress. Turley writes: 
  
 77 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159-60. As detailed in the Court’s 
decision, previous FDA commissioners had expressed the view that the FDA did not 
have the authority to regulate tobacco. Id. at 145. The FDA, led by Commissioner 
David Kessler, changed its position after its investigation indicated that the tobacco 
companies were aware of nicotine’s addictive properties and had engineered their 
tobacco products in order to create and maintain addiction. Previous FDA 
commissioners had not been aware of such facts. See KESSLER, supra note 62, at 381 
(“[The Supreme Court justices] were unable to recognize how much had changed, how 
much more we understood, not only about the effects of nicotine, but about the extent 
of the industry’s knowledge. We finally had evidence of intent.”). 
 78 See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of 
Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 226 (2000). 
 79 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159 (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial 
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 80 See supra Part I.C. 
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The circumvention of Congress in the FDA case was open and 
notorious. Not only did the FDA break from its long-held position 
that it lacked the authority to regulate tobacco, but prior to seeking 
this authority through the courts, the Clinton administration was 
rebuffed in an attempt to secure a legislative mandate.81 
In this view, the Court was trying to strike down an end-run 
around Congress and simply restore tobacco regulation to the 
status quo ante. Since this reasoning was not made explicit, 
however, the Court’s facially neutral application of the Chevron 
test—which Turley characterizes as “a strikingly contextual 
view”82—was established as precedent for future plaintiffs to 
utilize in challenging other regulatory actions.83 
B. Subsequent Applications of Chevron and FDA v. Brown 
& Williamson 
Even without the tobacco-focused Brown & Williamson 
decision, perhaps the Supreme Court would have moved 
towards a less deferential application of the Chevron test in 
any event. Other notable decisions preceding Brown & 
Williamson—in particular, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. 
AT&T 84—have been similarly described as “discretion-denying” 
decisions that evaded the requirements of Chevron.85 Moreover, 
later cases that did not cite or reference Brown & Williamson 
also imposed further limitations on the reach of Chevron 
deference.86 In general, this long-term effort by the Court to 
undermine or limit Chevron deference has been attributed to 
  
 81 Turley, supra note 23, at 457. 
 82 Id. at 456. 
 83 As previously noted, nine years after the Brown & Williamson decision, the 
U.S. Congress did grant the FDA limited regulatory authority over the tobacco 
industry. See supra note 11. Congress’s decision to belatedly revisit the issue does 
nothing to limit the ability of future litigants to use Brown & Williamson as a 
precedent when seeking to strike down administrative actions.  
 84 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
 85 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 243, 244 (2006). 
In MCI, the Supreme Court held that the FCC had exceeded its authority in ruling 
that long-distance carriers other than AT&T would no longer have to file their rates 
with the FCC. 521 U.S. at 218; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to 
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 970 (1992) (“[I]n recent Terms the application 
of Chevron has resulted in less deference to executive interpretations than was the case 
in the pre-Chevron era. Thus, instead of functioning as a ‘counter-Marbury,’ there are 
signs that Chevron is being transformed by the Court into a new judicial mandate ‘to 
say what the law is.’”). 
 86 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (suggesting that 
less formal administrative rulemaking processes were not entitled to full Chevron 
deference). 
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the Court’s desire to assert its own authority and retain some 
oversight over administrative decisions, a desire obviously in 
tension with the dictates of Chevron.87 One could read Brown & 
Williamson as one example among many of the Court asserting 
its right to restrict agency discretion, and thus its uniqueness 
should not be overstated. Nonetheless, subsequent applications 
of the precedent established in Brown & Williamson show that 
the case was particularly influential in the field of public 
health, where, as discussed above, a significant degree of 
agency flexibility is needed to protect against emerging public 
health threats.88 
1. Nutritional Health Alliance v. FDA (2003)  
It did not take long for the ruling of Brown & 
Williamson to start impacting public health cases outside the 
tobacco control arena. Even before Brown & Williamson was 
decided, a group of diet supplement manufacturers filed a 
lawsuit challenging the FDA’s regulatory authority in another 
area.89 To deal with the problem of iron poisoning—a leading 
cause of death among young children—the FDA had issued 
regulations requiring dietary supplements containing high 
doses of iron to be distributed in unit-dose packages.90 In 
  
 87 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 85, at 998 (“[Chevron] reduc[es] the role of the 
courts to a point that threatens to undermine the principal constitutional constraint on 
agency misbehavior. Given these failings, it is small wonder that the Court often seems 
wary of the Chevron doctrine, applying it inconsistently at best.”); Eric R. Womack, 
Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s 
Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REV. 289, 291 
(2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court has chosen to limit the scope of Chevron and refocus the 
inquiry into congressional intent in order to limit unprincipled deference and 
delegation to agencies that can exercise such power without sufficient procedural 
protections.”); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron 
to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1202 (2008) (suggesting that the Supreme Court applies 
a “continuum of deference” and is less deferential when agency decisions involve 
“larger normative concerns”). 
 88 See, e.g., Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from 
Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 779-80 (2007) (“In Chevron, one of the 
Court’s rationales for deferring to the agency’s interpretation was that by enacting 
gaps and creating ambiguities, Congress intended to delegate implicitly to the agency. 
But in a series of cases, starting with FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the 
Court rejected, or at least limited, this rationale.”); James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference 
in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of 
Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939, 976 (2008) (“[Brown & Williamson] was a dramatic 
decision that has had ripple effects on the law of deference to administrative rules.”).  
 89 Nutritional Health Alliance v. FDA (Nutritional I), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
22330 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2000), rev’d, 318 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2003).  
 90 Id. at *3-5. 
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Nutritional Health Alliance v. FDA, an association of 
manufacturers challenged the rule, asserting that the FDA had 
exceeded its authority in promulgating the regulations. They 
argued that the FDCA did cover issues of poison prevention 
and that such concerns could only be addressed by the 
Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC).91  
As the case was pending, the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, and the plaintiffs 
immediately brought it to the attention of Judge Sterling 
Johnson, Jr. Presumably relying on the Supreme Court’s 
statement that FDA v. Brown & Williamson was a “unique” 
case, Judge Johnson wrote that “the nature of the tobacco-
specific legislation makes the case inapplicable here,” and that 
he would instead follow the dictates of Chevron.92 Judge 
Johnson went on to conclude that the FDA rule was authorized 
under either prong of the Chevron test; by its plain meaning, 
the FDCA authorized the FDA’s exercise of authority, and even 
assuming arguendo that there was some ambiguity in the 
statute, the FDA’s construction of the statute was a permissible 
one.93 
Saying nothing about the uniqueness of tobacco, the 
Second Circuit relied heavily on the “instructive guidance” 
from FDA v. Brown & Williamson in reversing the district 
court’s opinion.94 Using Brown & Williamson as precedent, it 
concluded the language of a statute must be read in light of 
subsequent congressional action. The court wrote: 
Following [United States v. Estate of] Romani and Brown & 
Williamson, we would not defer to the FDA regarding its 
interpretation of ambiguous language in the [FDCA] where doing so 
would allow the FDA to circumvent the detailed regulatory 
scheme . . . set forth by Congress in the [Poison Prevention 
Packaging Act (which granted limited authority for poison control to 
the CPSC)].95 
As the FDA had argued, however, the Poison Prevention Act 
did not in any way directly limit the FDA’s authority (though 
Congress certainly could have included such a provision).96 
  
 91 Nutritional Health Alliance v. FDA (Nutritional II), 318 F.3d 92, 94 (2d 
Cir. 2003). 
 92 Nutritional I, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22330 at *9 n.3. 
 93 Id. at *11-12. 
 94 Nutritional II, 318 F.3d at 102. 
 95 Id. at 104. 
 96 Nutritional I, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22330 at *7-8. 
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Although the court purported to apply step two of the Chevron 
test, it was clear that the Second Circuit was, like the Supreme 
Court in Brown & Williamson, using a “contextual” reading of 
the FDCA as the basis for substituting its own judgment for 
that of the FDA.  
2. Supreme Beef Processors (2000) and Association of 
American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. (2002) 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson has also been used as 
authority by several district courts that have struck down 
health-related regulations. In these cases, FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson seems to have tipped the scales, providing these 
courts with legal support for overturning a regulation where a 
more deferential posture would have led to the opposite result.  
For example, in Supreme Beef Processors v. United 
States Department of Agriculture, the regulation at issue 
involved the testing of processed beef for salmonella.97 Under 
the relevant statute, the USDA was authorized to bar the sale 
or transport of meat if “it has been prepared, packed or held 
under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become 
contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been rendered 
injurious to health.”98 Since salmonella results from unsanitary 
conditions and is the leading cause of food-borne illness, USDA 
developed a salmonella test to measure compliance with this 
provision.99 Supreme Beef Processors—which had failed the 
salmonella test three different times—argued that the USDA 
had exceeded its authority in testing for salmonella, because 
the salmonella could have resulted from contaminated beef 
entering the assembly line, and not (or not solely) from 
unsanitary conditions in the plant itself.100 The court agreed 
with this reasoning, concluding that the USDA could not block 
the sale of Supreme Beef Processor’s meat because “the 
agency—in effect—never found the conditions of Supreme 
Beef’s plant insanitary”—only the meat itself.101 This exercise in 
semantic nitpicking, which produced a result quite unsettling 
to anyone who eats meat, runs contrary to the deferential 
approach of Chevron. The court, however, based its approach 
  
 97 113 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1048 (N.D. Tx. 2000), aff’d, 275 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 98 Id. at 1052 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(4)). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 1052-53. 
 101 Id. at 1054 (emphasis added). 
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on Brown & Williamson, quoting its language that “[t]he 
meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only 
become evident when placed in context.”102 Like the Supreme 
Court in Brown & Williamson, the district court then 
proceeded to read the ambiguity out of the statute by finding a 
“contextual meaning” (in this case, based on the court’s 
analysis of the overall structure of the Federal Meat Inspection 
Act) that limited the USDA’s authority.103 Nowhere in the 
decision was there a mention of the “uniqueness” of tobacco (or, 
for that matter, any discussion of the facts of Brown & 
Williamson).  
In dealing with a somewhat more complex issue, the 
D.C. District Court in Association of American Physicians and 
Surgeons, Inc. v. FDA struck down an FDA regulation 
requiring most new pharmaceuticals to be tested for efficacy in 
pediatric populations.104 The FDA had claimed authority to act 
under broad enabling provisions of the FDCA.105 The plaintiffs, 
citing a later statute that addressed pediatric testing more 
specifically (though without directly limiting the broader 
provisions of the FDCA), argued that the FDA had exceeded its 
authority.106 In ruling for the plaintiffs, the court directly 
rejected the conception that the tobacco issue addressed in 
Brown & Williamson was a unique or unusual case. Instead, 
the court wrote: 
This situation is therefore analogous to the one faced by the 
Supreme Court in Brown & Williamson; the FDA and Congress have 
both spoken and have taken two different approaches to respond to 
the same public health issue. Brown & Williamson suggests that by 
enacting a “distinct regulatory scheme” to address a given issue . . . 
Congress demonstrates its intention to occupy the field, and any 
attempt by the FDA to intervene with an inconsistent regime shall 
be deemed in excess of its authority. This militates strongly in favor 
of concluding that the FDA exceeded its authority when it enacted 
the [rule requiring pediatric tests].107 
Again, other congressional action in a similar field may have 
been relevant to whether the FDA’s interpretation of the scope 
of its authority was “reasonable.” But instead of deferentially 
  
 102 Id. at 1051 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)). 
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 104 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 205 (D.D.C. 2002). 
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 106 Id. at 205, 219. 
 107 Id. at 219 (citations omitted). 
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asking whether the FDA had acted reasonably in applying an 
ambiguous statute, the court avoided the question by ignoring 
the statute’s patent ambiguity and collapsing the Chevron 
analysis into one step. Indeed, the court’s analysis—building on 
Brown & Williamson—suggests that anytime Congress has 
passed a law addressing a public health issue, it has intended 
to preclude any further regulatory action on the subject. Such a 
doctrine is a drastic departure from Chevron’s deferential 
approach to agency regulations and would severely tie the 
hands of public health agencies.  
In sum, Brown & Williamson “embed[s] an unhealthy 
status quo bias into administrative law,” making agencies wary 
of using their existing authority to tackle new challenges, even 
when the broad language of their authorizing statutes could 
justify such action.108 This “status quo bias” is particularly 
dangerous in the field of public health, where the next public 
health challenge is always an unknown, and agency flexibility 
is therefore crucial.109 Ironically, in dealing with the issue of 
tobacco—a public health challenge with a very long history—
the Supreme Court may have weakened the government’s 
ability to adequately prepare for and address future public 
health challenges. Although the Supreme Court stated in 
Brown & Williamson that tobacco was a “unique case,” the 
discussion above demonstrates that Brown & Williamson was 
quickly seized upon by those seeking to challenge government 
regulations in a variety of other contexts.  
C. State Analogues 
The problem of attempted tobacco regulation leading to 
new constraints on agency authority is not limited to the 
federal government. The same dynamic plays out at the state 
level, and given that state public health authorities are often 
the first line of defense in dealing with public health challenges 
and crises, this is potentially even more dangerous. 
  
 108 See Sunstein, supra note 85, at 246. 
 109 Of course, a deferential posture towards agency decisions can be 
problematic from a public health perspective if agencies are interpreting their own 
authorizing statutes narrowly or using their discretion not to regulate public health 
concerns. From a long-term perspective, however, this is less troubling. An agency’s 
decision not to act can be easily reversed (by a subsequent administrator or 
administration). A Supreme Court ruling explicitly limiting the scope of agency 
discretion cannot be so easily undone. 
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Although the legal reasoning has differed from the 
federal cases, state courts have been similarly reluctant to 
allow public health entities to apply their broad regulatory 
authority to the issue of tobacco. In some cases, state courts 
have relied on the absence of an explicit delegation to strike 
down tobacco-related regulations, even when the same courts 
had never insisted on such express delegation in the past.  
For example, in D.A.B.E. v. Toledo-Lucas County, the 
Ohio Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a local 
board of health had the authority to limit smoking in public 
places.110 As in Brown & Williamson, at issue was a novel 
application of extremely broad statutory authority. In that 
case, the relevant Ohio law, Ohio Revised Code § 3709.21, 
stated that “[t]he board of health of a general health district 
may make such orders and regulations as are necessary for its 
own government, for the public health, the prevention or 
restriction of disease, and the prevention, abatement, or 
suppression of nuisances.”111 The plain language seemed to 
provide authority for the secondhand smoke regulations at 
issue, particularly since the Surgeon General of the United 
States had found that “nonsmokers are placed at increased risk 
for developing disease as the result of exposure to [secondhand] 
smoke” and that “measures to protect the public health are 
required now.”112 Nonetheless, the court went out of its way to 
avoid directly addressing the plain meaning of the text. 
Echoing Brown & Williamson, the court wrote: 
[T]he natural meaning of words is not always conclusive as to the 
construction of statutes. While it is a long-recognized canon of 
statutory construction that the words and phrases used by the 
General Assembly will be construed in their usual, ordinary 
meaning, that is not so when a contrary intention of the legislature 
clearly appears. Accordingly and for the following reasons, we find 
that the General Assembly has not indicated any intent through 
[Ohio Rev. Code § 3709.21], or otherwise, to vest local boards of 
health with unlimited authority to adopt regulations addressing all 
public-health concerns.113 
The court went on to conclude—for the first time in the long 
history of the statue—that § 3709.21 was “a rules-enabling 
  
 110 773 N.E.2d 536, 539 (Ohio 2002). 
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 112 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF 
INVOLUNTARY SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, at xi-xii (1986), 
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statute, not a provision granting substantive regulatory 
authority.”114 It explained that in order for public health 
authorities to address a particular public health issue, they 
would need to point to another statute providing explicit 
authority for such an action, in addition to the general 
rulemaking powers provided in § 3709.21.115 In order to reach 
this conclusion, the court had to ignore or reinterpret several 
Ohio Supreme Court cases that had upheld health authority 
regulations based solely on the authority provided by § 3709.21 
or its predecessor statute.116 Indeed, in previous cases the court 
had emphasized the need for regulatory flexibility in 
addressing public health challenges, writing (when referring to 
the predecessor of § 3709.21): “Where a law relates to a police 
regulation for the protection of public health, and it is 
impossible or impractical to provide specific standards, and to 
do so would defeat the legislative object sought to be 
accomplished, such law is valid and constitutional without 
providing such standards.”117 
How had the Ohio Supreme Court reached a conclusion 
that seemed to reject its own precedents? The Court semi-
apologetically wrote that “[o]ur disposition of this matter turns 
on issues of law and not on the deleterious effect of 
environmental tobacco smoke, more commonly known as 
secondhand smoke.”118 Nonetheless, it seems virtually certain 
that the unique political salience of the issue at hand—the 
regulation of smoking in public places—was the driving force 
behind the Court’s decision.  
As in Brown & Williamson, the Court likely viewed the 
Board of Health’s action as an end run around the legislature 
on a controversial political issue. In a brief aside, the Court 
wrote: 
Administrative regulations cannot dictate public policy but rather 
can only develop and administer policy already established by the 
General Assembly. In promulgating the Clean Indoor Air 
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 116 See, e.g., Johnson’s Markets, Inc. v. New Carlisle Dep’t of Health, 567 
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Regulation, petitioners engaged in policy-making requiring a 
balancing of social, political, economic, and privacy concerns. Such 
concerns are legislative in nature, and by engaging in such actions, 
petitioners have gone beyond administrative rule-making and 
usurped power delegated to the General Assembly.119 
In short, the Court felt that tobacco regulation was a 
contentious public issue most properly resolved by the 
legislative branch, and not an unelected Board of Health. 
Courts rarely view administrative rulemaking as a problem 
when non-tobacco regulations are at issue, despite the fact that 
every public health regulation is a policy-making exercise 
“requiring a balancing of social, political, economic, and privacy 
concerns.”120 When tobacco is at issue, however, judges are often 
sympathetic to the argument that decisions about such a 
weighty issue—with its powerful historical, social, cultural, 
and political baggage—cannot be left to public health 
authorities.121 
Ultimately, the D.A.B.E. decision did not derail progress 
towards smoke-free regulations in Ohio—it merely rechanneled 
the effort away from health departments and into the political 
arena. In 2006, Ohio voters passed a ballot measure prohibiting 
smoking in nearly all indoor public places.122 Like Brown & 
Williamson, however, D.A.B.E. still stands as a precedent that 
may hamper regulatory efforts in other areas of public health. 
In essence, the D.A.B.E. holding means that boards of public 
health in Ohio can only be reactive; they are prohibited from 
  
 119 Id. at 546 (citations omitted). At the time of this decision, there were some 
state laws addressing smoking in public places. Unlike Brown & Williamson, however, 
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boards of public health to regulate in this area. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
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 122 The ballot measure is codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3794.01-.09 
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proactively addressing public health threats that have not yet 
received the sustained public attention needed to produce 
legislative action.123 The public health implications of such a 
ruling are impossible to measure, but they will be all too real 
when public health authorities are unable to address future 
public health concerns in a timely manner.124  
III. TOBACCO LITIGATION AND PERSONAL INJURY/PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY CLAIMS 
As discussed in Part I, tobacco litigation has been, in the 
words of Robert Rabin, “unique in the annals of tort 
litigation.”125 This section addresses the legal impact of tobacco-
related personal injury lawsuits on the field of public health 
litigation. Tobacco litigation has led to pro-defendant rulings in 
the areas of preemption, class action certification, and punitive 
damages that have, in turn, significantly limited the potential 
impact of public health litigation in other areas. Before 
exploring the degree to which tobacco cases have influenced 
personal injury law, two detours are in order: a discussion of 
the role of personal injury litigation in promoting public health, 
and a very brief history of early tobacco litigation. 
A. Public Health Litigation: Pro and Con 
Whether lawsuits brought by private citizens can 
effectively promote public health goals is a question that has 
been debated for years. Jon Vernick, et al, present the general 
argument in favor of public health litigation as follows: 
As a society, we make decisions about how to balance the risks and 
benefits of consumer products. One way we strike that balance is by 
allowing litigation against product makers when risks become too 
great. In this way, litigation can act as a public health feedback 
mechanism to affect manufacturers’ safety practices. If a product is 
considered unsafe (or society is less willing to accept certain risks), 
  
 123 D.A.B.E., 773 N.E.2d at 549. 
 124 The D.A.B.E. decision has not been the basis for court challenges to health-
related regulations, but that is likely because the bright line rule laid down by D.A.B.E. 
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 125 Rabin, Sociolegal History, supra note 15, at 857.  
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more litigation may follow. As manufacturers respond, products can 
become safer, the likelihood of successful litigation is reduced, and 
fewer lawsuits (and injuries) will result.126 
Although this is a standard argument in favor of health-related 
litigation, it is easy to see how tobacco—a product that cannot 
be made safe—does not fit easily into this paradigm. 
In addition to prompting changes in product design and 
serving the traditional tort litigation goal of compensating 
injured victims, others have argued that public health 
litigation can also (a) increase costs for dangerous products 
(thereby decreasing demand and/or forcing the industry to 
internalize costs imposed on others), (b) bring health risks to 
the attention of regulators and legislators, (c) heighten public 
awareness of public health risks (potentially leading to social 
change), (d) uncover industry misconduct, and (e) deter future 
misconduct.127 They point to a list of public health 
improvements credited to personal injury and products liability 
litigation: cars with airbags and shoulder restraints, the 
removal of dangerous products (such as asbestos and the 
Dalkon Shield intrauterine device) from the marketplace, and 
the clean-up of environmental toxins.128 
On the other hand, some scholars have argued that 
public health litigation constitutes public policy advocacy by 
other means (often by parties who have been unable to 
convince the legislature to adopt their position), and as such, it 
is an anti-democratic “misuse of the courts.”129 Furthermore, 
some public health specialists have argued that courts are not 
the proper venue for addressing public health concerns because 
courts have limited remedies at their disposal (typically 
monetary damages that may unfairly single out particular 
defendants) and flexible regulatory bodies are better equipped 
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to deal with public health concerns.130 Finally, some have 
argued that lawsuits are simply an ineffective means of 
promoting public health.131 
It is unnecessary (and would be futile) to try to resolve 
this longstanding dispute here. Regardless, it seems clear that 
the ability of personal injury lawsuits to serve public health 
ends has been significantly eroded by judicial decisions over 
the past several decades. It is also clear that tobacco-related 
decisions have played a prominent role in this erosion. These 
developments are particularly troubling if one agrees with the 
premise that private litigation “does play a vital and 
indispensable role in ensuring the safety and accountability of 
product manufacturers and industrial polluters.”132 Even if one 
rejects the social significance of public health litigation, 
however, it is still important for those involved in health-
related litigation to understand the ways in which relevant 
legal doctrines have been influenced by tobacco litigation.  
B. Early Tobacco Litigation and Cipollone 
Tobacco litigation has occurred in three distinct 
“waves.”133 The first and longest wave began soon after the 
initial revelations about the connection between smoking and 
lung cancer in the 1950s, and lasted until the 1980s. The 
plaintiffs were almost all lung cancer victims or their families, 
and their claims were “grounded in varying theories of 
negligence, misrepresentation and breach of warranty.”134 Due 
to the tobacco industry’s early adoption of an aggressive, 
“scorched earth” strategy, few of these cases made it to trial. Of 
those that did, the industry’s argument that the connection 
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between smoking and lung cancer had not been conclusively 
established successfully defeated all claims of liability. 
When the causation defense became untenable in the 
1980s, the tobacco industry deftly shifted its argument to 
defend against the “second wave” of tobacco litigation: 
For years they had denied their products were unsafe. Now they 
insisted instead that the hazards they had indignantly denied for so 
long were no longer preposterous, but were suddenly, in fact, 
“common knowledge” — so much so that smokers were fully aware of 
them and had, in fact, “assumed the risk” of death and disease. So 
well known were these risks, manufacturers argued, that smokers 
could not claim to have “relied” on the industry’s own denials. 
Perhaps most audaciously, manufacturers were able to invoke these 
defenses without so much as acknowledging the inconsistencies of 
their positions, and without ever conceding that tobacco causes 
disease.135 
As with all of the first wave cases, the hundreds of second wave 
plaintiffs were similarly unable to win a case against the 
tobacco industry—until Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., which 
ushered in the “third wave” of tobacco litigation.136 
Cipollone was the first case in which the tobacco 
industry lost a jury verdict—a $400,000 award to the plaintiff. 
The breakthrough of Cipollone was driven by the plaintiff’s 
attorney’s ability to  
gain access to internal industry documents and testimony of former 
industry employees to an extent then unprecedented in the forty-
year history of litigation against the industry—documents and 
testimony indicating the industry had discouraged internal efforts to 
take cognizance of the health risks of smoking and to develop a safer 
cigarette.137 
This verdict demonstrated that the tobacco industry was not 
invincible in court, and it seemed to presage an onslaught of 
litigation that would bury the tobacco industry under the 
weight of its own documents.  
But the tobacco industry survived this “third wave” of 
litigation intact, and in some ways emerged even stronger than 
before. Its success was built in large part on its ability to 
persuade the court to adopt new legal doctrines limiting its 
liability, including an expansive notion of federal preemption, a 
narrow view of class action certification, and Due Process 
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limitations on punitive damages. These doctrines not only 
helped the tobacco industry to endure the “third wave” of 
tobacco litigation; they also dramatically reshaped the legal 
landscape for other types of public health litigation.  
C. Preemption 
1. Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc. 
After decades of frustration, the jury verdict in 
Cipollone provided the first glimmer of hope for those hoping to 
defeat the tobacco industry in court. These hopes were quickly 
dashed, however, when the Supreme Court agreed to hear the 
Cipollone appeal and ultimately ruled that the common law 
failure to warn claims against Liggett were preempted by the 
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA).138 
The FCLAA is the statute that requires warning labels to be 
placed on cigarette packs, and the primary purpose of its 
preemption provision had been to prevent “diverse, 
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising 
regulations.”139 Though the Court interpreted the authorizing 
clause in FDA v. Brown & Williamson narrowly in order to 
preclude FDA regulation of tobacco, it took the opposite 
approach (though with a similar substantive result) in 
Cipollone, reading the preemption clause of the FCLAA broadly 
in order to preempt tort suits against the tobacco industry. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion did not directly suggest 
that preemption principles should operate differently in the 
context of tobacco, but its decision was a striking departure 
from past precedent. At issue was § 5 of the FCLAA (titled 
“Preemption”), which read in part: 
(b) . . . No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health 
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or 
promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in 
conformity with the provisions of this chapter.140  
Every circuit court that had addressed the issue had concluded 
that the preemption provision of § 5(b) did not expressly 
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preclude common law tort claims.141 Courts assumed that the 
preemption provision applied only to affirmative regulatory 
action by state legislatures and regulators, not to common law 
litigation. For example, the Third Circuit (from which the 
Cipollone appeal originated) had noted that Congress could 
have easily included a provision in the FCLAA preempting 
common law tort claims—as it had done in other statutes—but 
it had not.142  
The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, gave 
lip service to the presumption that “the historic police powers 
of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act 
unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress,”143 
but then proceeded to blithely ignore the intent of Congress in 
finding that “[t]he phrase ‘no requirement or prohibition’ 
sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive 
enactments and common law.”144 Justice Stevens wrote that 
“[a]lthough portions of the legislative history of the 1969 Act 
suggest that Congress was primarily concerned with positive 
enactments by states and localities, the language of the Act 
plainly reaches beyond such enactments.”145 In other words, the 
plurality opinion held that since the language of the statute 
was so abundantly clear, there was no need to consider 
evidence regarding Congress’s intent. Given that the circuit 
courts had not found any such clarity in Congress’s words—and 
given that there was considerable evidence of a different 
congressional intent—this was an astounding conclusion.146 In a 
partial dissent, Justice Blackmun wrote that “[u]nlike the 
plurality, I am unwilling to believe that Congress, without any 
  
 141 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 542 n.6 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing cases).  
 142 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1986), rev’d, 
505 U.S. 504 (1992). Likewise, the Fifth Circuit wrote: “It is clear, however, that [the 
FCLAA preemption provision] does not make any reference to a state tort claim, even 
indirectly, which relates to the effects of smoking upon health. We must conclude that 
the Act does not expressly preempt [the plaintiff’s] products liability claims.” 
Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 143 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (alterations in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa 
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).  
 144 Id. at 521 (plurality opinion). 
 145 Id. (citations omitted). 
 146 Notably, “[l]ess than a decade earlier, in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 
464 U.S. 238 (1984), all nine members of the Court had agreed that actions to recover 
compensatory damages survived sweeping federal pre-emption in the nuclear safety 
field.” Lars Noah, The Preemption Morass: Medtronic Leaves Muddled the Question of 
Whether or When Federal Law Preempts Tort Law Claims Against Defective Medical 
Devices, LEGAL TIMES, July 29, 1996, at S37.  
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mention of state common-law damages actions or its intention 
dramatically to expand the scope of federal pre-emption, would 
have eliminated the only means of judicial recourse for those 
injured by the cigarette manufacturers’ unlawful conduct.”147  
Although the methodology differed, the Court’s 
approach in Cipollone presaged the later Brown & Williamson 
decision. In both cases, the Court was faced with a legal rule 
instructing it to use a highly deferential approach in 
interpreting statutory language, yet it refused to recognize any 
ambiguity in the statutes. In Brown & Williamson, the Court 
looked at the context of subsequent congressional actions in 
order to find the statute’s “clear meaning,” whereas Cipollone 
ignored contrary congressional intent and redefined the 
relevant terms for itself. In both instances, the Court supported 
the tobacco companies’ position, applying its own reading of the 
statute instead of deferring to the administrative agency (in 
Brown & Williamson) or the states (in Cipollone). 
As in Brown & Williamson, it seems likely that 
unspoken policy concerns and questions of institutional 
competency lay behind the Court’s decision in Cipollone. Allan 
Brandt writes: 
Tobacco litigation became a lightning rod for a larger public debate 
about the role of tort litigation in American society. For critics of the 
liability revolution, suits against tobacco companies epitomized the 
excesses of tort claims, if not the ultimate perversion of the courts. 
According to such arguments—encouraged by the industry—tobacco 
litigation was an abuse of the legal system in several ways. First, it 
was a veiled attempt to secure through the courts regulatory 
legislation that Congress had never enacted. This marked a 
constitutionally inappropriate breach in the separation of powers. 
Second, the litigation created a radical expansion of torts that 
threatened to flood all industries with costly and spurious claims 
from consumers. Finally, tobacco liability was seen as a cultural 
failure: the refusal of individuals to take responsibility for their own 
willful actions.148 
Awareness of these concerns likely influenced the Supreme 
Court’s decision to limit—but not entirely eliminate—avenues 
for tobacco-related litigation.149 The Supreme Court was 
  
 147 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 542 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 148 BRANDT, supra note 2, at 353. 
 149 Though the Cipollone case barred failure to warn claims, the plurality 
opinion held that state law fraud claims were not preempted by the FCLAA. This part 
of the opinion was recently reaffirmed by a five-to-four margin in Altria Group, Inc. v. 
Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008). The four dissenting Justices would have held that the 
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understandably reluctant to place the courts at the center of a 
broader cultural and political battle, and it sought to protect 
the lower courts from the flood of litigation that would have 
inevitably followed a ruling for the plaintiff in Cipollone.150 
It is of course possible that the Supreme Court would 
have built towards an aggressive preemption doctrine anyway. 
Preemption is the subject of the “fiercest battle in products 
liability litigation today,” with a variety of industries—
supported by a well-organized and well-funded tort reform 
movement—pushing courts to declare that state tort law claims 
against them are preempted by federal law.151 Although the 
Supreme Court might have inevitably moved towards the same 
position as a more conservative court took the bench, reading a 
preemption clause broadly in cigarette context—which was 
perhaps less controversial because of general skepticism about 
the merits of tobacco litigation—clearly opened the door for the 
Court to build upon Cipollone in subsequent decisions 
unrelated to tobacco. Furthermore, as discussed below, the 
Cipollone decision immediately opened the door for similar 
preemption arguments in state courts and lower federal courts, 
providing for rapid expansion of the preemption doctrine. 
2. Post-Cipollone Decisions 
“Almost immediately after Cipollone was decided, the 
preemption theory permeated tort-claim cases in the lower 
courts, which began to read Cipollone as compelling 
preemption in a wide variety of circumstances.”152 Unlike in 
Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court had not suggested 
that its analysis was in any way limited to tobacco cases, and 
the lower courts did not imply any such limitation. Lower 
courts read Cipollone broadly for the proposition that the term 
“requirement,” when used in a preemption clause, now 
  
FCLAA also preempted all fraud-related claims against tobacco companies, which 
would have granted the companies virtual immunity from all health-related tort suits. 
Id. at 552 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 150 See Richard A. Daynard, Regulating Tobacco: The Need for a Public Health 
Judicial Decision-Making Cannon, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 281, 286 (2002) (writing that 
fear of a an overwhelming surge in tobacco-related cases led circuit courts to conclude 
that the FCLAA preempted tort law claims). 
 151 Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional 
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 450 (2008). 
 152 Robert J. Katerberg, Patching the “Crazy Quilt” of Cipollone: A Divided 
Court Rethinks Federal Preemption of Products Liability in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 75 
N.C. L. REV. 1440, 1478 (1997). 
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included all common law tort claims. Courts used this 
proposition to bar tort claims involving defective medical 
devices,153 herbicides and insecticides,154 and auto safety.155 
Justice Stevens, the author of the plurality decision in 
Cipollone, later retreated from the position he articulated in 
that case, finding himself on this short side of several 
subsequent preemption decisions that either reaffirmed or 
extended Cipollone.156 In Buckman v. Plaintiff’s Legal 
Committee, which extended Cipollone by taking a similarly 
broad view of implied preemption of common law claims, 
Justice Stevens expressed his concern: 
Under the preemption analysis the Court offers today . . . parties 
injured by fraudulent representations to federal agencies would have 
no remedy even if recognizing such a remedy would have no adverse 
consequences upon the operation or integrity of the regulatory 
process. I do not believe the reasons advanced in the Court’s opinion 
support the conclusion that Congress intended such a harsh result. 
Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984) 
(declining to infer that a federal statutory scheme that affords to 
alternative means of seeking redress pre-empted traditional state-
law remedies).157 
  
 153 See., e.g., Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(finding state tort law claims under the Medical Device Act preempted because “the 
Supreme Court has clearly stated that the word ‘requirement,’ in the context of an 
express preemption provision, includes state law claims”); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 
984 F.2d 1416, 1418 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting claim that collagen injection had caused 
autoimmune disease on same grounds). 
 154 See, e.g., King v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346, 1349 (1st 
Cir. 1993) (“The FIFRA [Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act] language 
prohibiting the states from ‘impos[ing] or continu[ing] in effect any requirements,’ 7 
U.S.C. § 136v(b), is virtually indistinguishable from the state-imposed ‘requirement’ 
language that Cipollone held preempted the state common law tort claims based on 
inadequate warning. FIFRA’s language, too, preempts the state law lack-of-warning 
claims involved in this case.” (alterations in original)); Levesque v. Miles, Inc., 816 F. 
Supp. 61, 70 (D.N.H. 1993) (finding that plaintiff’s claim based on insecticide that 
ignited without warning in his pocket was preempted by FIFRA).  
 155 See, e.g., Estate of Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 856 F. Supp. 574, 576-77 
(D. Colo. 1994) (finding that after Cipollone, claims relating to the lack of an airbag are 
expressly preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, despite a 
savings clause in the statute stating that “[c]ompliance with any Federal motor vehicle 
safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any 
liability under common law”), aff’d on related grounds, 75 F.3d 1414, 1421 (10th Cir. 
1996).  
 156 See Buckman v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353-355 (2001) 
(Stevens, J., concurring); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 157 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 355 (Stevens, J., concurring). In Buckman, the Court 
held that plaintiffs’ state law claims based on injuries caused by orthopedic bone 
screws were preempted because the screws had been approved by the FDA—even 
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Of course, by citing all the way back to Silkwood, Justice 
Stevens conveniently overlooked Cipollone. His own plurality 
decision in Cipollone, essentially holding that the statutory 
scheme in the FCLAA had “put a ceiling, as well as a floor, on 
the common law obligations of manufacturers to communicate 
the true dangers of their products to consumers,” had laid the 
groundwork for the majority’s decision in Buckman and similar 
cases.158 The gravamen of the Cipollone decision, after all, was 
that the tobacco companies could not be required to warn 
customers of known dangers, even if those dangers were much 
more severe than those recognized on the FCLAA-required 
warning labels. Justice Stevens has never directly argued that 
Cipollone should be limited to its facts because it involved 
cigarettes, but his retreat from its holding suggests a belief on 
his part that tobacco products somehow present a unique case. 
Justice Stevens’ reconsideration of his opinion, however, 
has not stopped the Supreme Court from building on the 
foundation of Cipollone. The most recent—and perhaps most 
troubling—example is Riegel v Medtronic,159 where the Court 
held that the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the FDCA 
expressly preempted common law tort claims for medical 
devices that had been approved by the FDA. At issue was a 
coronary balloon catheter that had ruptured during its use in 
angioplasty. Noting that the preemption clause included in the 
MDA precluded contrary “requirements” from being applied 
under state law, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority: “Absent 
other indication, reference to a State’s ‘requirements’ includes 
its common-law duties. As the plurality opinion said in 
Cipollone, common-law liability is ‘premised on the existence of 
a legal duty,’ and a tort judgment therefore establishes that the 
defendant has violated a state-law obligation.”160 
The absurdity of Riegel was that it read the preemption 
provision in the MDA in a way that was clearly not intended by 
its authors. Senator Ted Kennedy, the sole sponsor of the MDA 
in the Senate, filed an amicus brief strenuously arguing that no 
one in Congress ever considered that the preemption provision 
in the MDA would preempt state tort claims. He wrote that the 
term “requirements” was understood to apply only to state 
  
though plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer had misled the FDA in its application 
for approval. Id. at 343. 
 158 Daynard, supra note 150, at 286. 
 159 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). 
 160 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008. 
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regulations, and Congress did not even consider that the term 
might apply to lawsuits until the Cipollone decision in 1992 
(the MDA was passed in 1976). Senator Kennedy wrote (along 
with Congressman Henry Waxman): 
Congress was fully aware of widespread tort law suits over medical 
devices, yet there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest an 
intent [to] preempt such suits. At the time the MDA was enacted, 
Congress did not understand the term “requirement” to include state 
tort law verdicts. . . . If Congress had intended to preempt state tort 
law suits, it would have explicitly done so. Taking into account the 
plain language of the MDA preemption provision, the absence of any 
indication in the legislative history that Congress even considered 
the possibility that the provision would preempt state tort suits, the 
presumption against preemption, and the legislative purpose of the 
MDA, it is plain that the “requirements” preempted under the 
statute do not include state tort law suits.161 
The majority neatly dismissed this argument, writing that the 
preemption of state tort claims “is exactly what [the MDA 
preemption clause] does by its terms.”162 Therefore, because the 
meaning of the statute was so clear, the intent of Congress 
need not even be considered. Though this reasoning is 
spectacularly circular—because we read the term 
“requirements” to include tort claims, the term is not 
ambiguous—it is surely consistent with Cipollone.  
3. Public Health Impact 
Immunity from tort litigation—which is effectively what 
federal preemption provides—removes a major incentive for 
manufacturers to make their products as safe as possible or to 
alert consumers to newly-discovered dangers. The public health 
implications of this doctrine are likely to be significant. 
Consider, for example, the Riegel case itself and the regulation 
of medical devices. As David Vladeck has explained, the MDA 
approval process, while important, does not provide 
manufacturers with any meaningful incentives to alert 
consumers of new dangers that are discovered after the product 
is on the market. Vladeck writes: 
  
 161 Brief of Senator Edward M. Kennedy et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 21, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06-179). 
 162 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008-09. Legislation has been introduced in both 
houses of Congress to overrule Riegel. Thus far, the legislation has not been brought up 
for a vote. See Gregory D. Curfman et al., The Medical Device Safety Act of 2009, 360 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1550, 1551 (2009).  
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[P]remarket approval is a one-time licensing decision that is based 
on whether the device’s sponsor has shown a “reasonable assurance” 
of safety. There is no provision in the MDA for devices to be 
periodically re-certified by the FDA. Medical devices are often 
approved on the basis of a single clinical trial, often involving very 
small numbers of patients . . . . Once on the market, the FDA 
engages in only limited surveillance . . . . 
The FDA’s track record demonstrates the agency’s woeful inability to 
single-handedly protect the American people against defective and 
dangerous medical devices. Just in the past few years, we have seen 
massive recalls of defibrillators, pacemakers, heart valves, hip and 
knee prostheses, and heart pumps — all of which have exacted a 
terrible toll on the patients who have had them implanted in their 
bodies, and who often face the daunting prospect of explanation and 
replacement surgery. [If premarket approval preempts tort 
claims] . . . all of these people would be left without any remedy at 
all. Premarket approval is an important process intended to put an 
end to the marketing of devices without meaningful testing and with 
no assurance of safety. But while the [premarket approval] process 
provides minimum safeguards, it cannot replace the continuous and 
comprehensive safety incentives, information disclosure, and victim 
compensation that tort law has traditionally provided.163 
This is especially troublesome when one considers that “the 
data supporting a [premarket approval] application are 
compiled by the device manufacturer and are often 
unreliable.”164  
Beyond medical devices, Cipollone, as suggested above, 
led to federal court decisions preempting state tort law claims 
in a variety of other contexts. The public health implications of 
these decisions are exceedingly difficult to track, and in some 
instances the Supreme Court later held that lower courts had 
extended Cipollone too far.165 It is clear, however, that even if 
the Cipollone decision was based in part on the unique context 
and pressures of tobacco litigation, it armed defendants in a 
variety of other industries with a powerful (and often 
  
 163 DAVID C. VLADECK, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW & POLICY, 
THE EMERGING THREAT OF REGULATORY PREEMPTION 6-8 (2008) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted); see also David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 
PEPP. L. REV. 95, 126-30 (2005). Another concern is that “agency capture” may limit the 
effectiveness of regulatory oversight. See, e.g., VLADECK, THE EMERGING THREAT OF 
REGULATORY PREEMPTION, supra, at 16.  
 164 Brief for the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 17-18, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (No. 06-179) (citing an FDA Inspector 
General report revealing “serious deficiencies . . . in the clinical data submitted as part 
of pre-market applications”) (alteration in original). 
 165 See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 444 (2005) 
(holding that state law claims regarding negligent manufacturing and breach of 
warranty with respect to pesticides were not preempted by FIFRA).  
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successful) new weapon to use in defeating products liability 
actions and other state tort law claims. Justice Ginsburg, the 
sole dissenter in Riegel, was likely correct when she wrote: 
“[R]egardless of the strength of a plaintiff’s case, suits will be 
barred ab initio. The constriction of state authority ordered 
today was not mandated by Congress and is at odds with the 
MDA’s central purpose: to protect consumer safety.”166 The same 
can be said of the other cases that followed in Cipollone’s 
wake.167  
D. Class Certification 
Cipollone weakened tobacco litigation, but it did not end 
it. Cipollone held that post-1965 failure to warn cases were 
preempted, but the plurality decision left a window open for 
fraud and misrepresentation claims, as well as pre-1965 failure 
to warn actions. Moreover, the documents exposed in Cipollone 
and in the subsequent investigations of the tobacco industry by 
state attorneys general provided the means by which to 
establish the industry’s fraud. Individual litigation, however, 
remained extraordinarily expensive and risky, due to the 
industry’s aggressive litigation tactics. In the mid-1990s, the 
use of class action litigation appeared to be a promising avenue 
by which to neutralize the industry’s financial advantages and 
aggregate “individual claims for harm into one massive tort 
challenge to the industry.”168 Cases in the 1980s had shown the 
class action to be a powerful tool that could address serious 
  
 166 128 S. Ct. at 1020 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 167 In an important recent case, the Supreme Court in Wyeth v. Levine found 
that tort claims against the pharmaceutical industry were not preempted by federal 
law. 129 S.Ct. 1187 (2009). Unlike Cipollone and Reigel, Wyeth did not involve an issue 
of express preemption. The plaintiffs had argued that preemption should be implied 
because state tort law interfered with the ability of the FDA to exercise its control over 
the pharmaceutical industry. This argument was rejected six-to-three by the court. Id. 
at 1200 (“If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it 
surely would have enacted an express pre-emption provision at some point during the 
FDCA’s 70-year history. But despite its 1976 enactment of an express pre-emption 
provision for medical devices, Congress has not enacted such a provision for 
prescription drugs.” (citation omitted)). Thus, Wyeth did not in any way overrule or 
limit Cipollone and its progeny, though it did put some limits on the doctrine of implied 
preemption.  
 168 Rabin, Third Wave, supra note 133, at 179. Class actions also had the 
potential to “reduce the focus on individual behavior and diagnosis.” BRANDT, supra 
note 2, at 405. 
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public health threats such as DES, the Dalkon Shield 
intrauterine contraceptive, Agent Orange, and asbestos.169 
Despite the promise of class action litigation, tobacco-
related class actions ultimately failed, and it is now generally 
agreed that “class action litigation has largely fallen by the 
wayside as a means of determining collective liability for 
victims of mass products torts.”170 Although the collapse of the 
class action is not solely due to the impact of tobacco litigation, 
tobacco cases appear to have sealed the fate of the mass tort 
class action. At least when it comes to health-related cases, the 
consensus is that “the mass tort class action is as dead as a 
doornail.”171 
Two different issues have made it difficult for plaintiffs 
in tobacco-related cases to achieve class certification. The first 
is the question of “commonality.”172 In tobacco cases—as in 
other health-related cases—individual issues play a significant 
role. Questions about whether the plaintiffs relied on the 
tobacco companies’ misstatements or whether their injuries 
were caused by smoking are fact-specific inquiries where the 
answers likely vary from person to person. For such questions, 
class action certification may not be appropriate. This problem 
can be mitigated, however, by seeking issue certification on 
  
 169 Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total 
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 382 (2005). If most injured 
individuals lack either the impetus (due to widely dispersed harm) or the resources to 
bring individual lawsuits, defendants will be “under-deterred.” The class action held 
the promise of remedying this problem while also promoting greater efficiency in the 
court system: 
[T]he class action deters defendants from externalizing the costs of their 
actions by causing widespread, but individually minimal harm. Potential 
defendants know that they will be held accountable for such harm in both 
monetary and reputational terms, and they therefore have a greater 
incentive to avoid engaging in harmful activities. This deterrence function 
ultimately benefits consumers and courts alike, as greater deterrence leads to 
fewer future injuries and future lawsuits. 
Developments in the Law: The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1809-
10 (2000) (citation omitted). 
 170 Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual Causation Requirement 
in Mass Products Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 895 (2005). 
 171 Gilles, supra note 169, at 388. 
 172 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), class action certification is 
appropriate only when “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to 
class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
44 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1 
questions shared by the entire class, while leaving individual 
issues to be resolved later.173  
The second issue is one of magnitude. Courts have been 
reluctant to allow certification for extremely large classes, 
particularly in situations where a verdict for the plaintiff class 
could potentially bankrupt the defendants. Given the number 
of current and former smokers, tobacco-related class actions 
inevitably present this issue. The concern about magnitude 
was famously outlined by Judge Richard Posner in In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc.174 In Rhone-Poulenc, a case involving a 
plaintiff class of hemophiliacs who had been exposed to the 
AIDS virus, Judge Posner advanced the novel argument 
(indeed, one that the defendant had not raised until oral 
argument) that high-stakes class actions unfairly pressure 
defendants to either settle or “stake their companies on the 
outcome of a single jury trial.”175 He argued that class action 
treatment might be appropriate where “individual suits are 
infeasible because the claim of each class member is tiny 
relative to the expense of litigation,” but he found that “[t]hat 
plainly is not the situation here.”176 
Courts have not always distinguished between these 
two concerns when denying class certification in tobacco-
related cases, but the concern about class size and potential 
unfairness to the defendants has likely played the more 
  
 173 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4) provides that “[w]hen appropriate, 
an action may be maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). 
 174 51 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (7th Cir. 1995); cf. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class 
Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475, 1481 (2005) (“The Rhone-Poulenc 
decision has been vastly influential in all aspects of class action jurisprudence. Its ‘free 
market’ attitude toward the maturation of mass torts through repetitive trials in 
multiple jurisdictions has held sway across the country . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 175 51 F.3d. at 1299. Although Judge Posner advanced other reasons for 
decertifying the class, this concern appeared to be his “core reason.” Gilles, supra note 
169, at 386. 
 176 Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299. This reasoning leads to the odd result that 
in life-and-death cases, where a group of plaintiffs have been killed or seriously injured 
by the defendant, class action treatment is almost never appropriate. On the other 
hand, class actions can be used for cases with trivial damages such as lawsuits 
involving overpriced cosmetics or “junk faxes.” See, e.g., Azizian v. Federated Dep’t 
Stores, Inc., 243 Fed. Appx. 311, 312 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming certification of class 
action and approval of final settlement in cosmetics-related antitrust case); CE Design 
v. Beaty Constr., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5842 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2009) (certifying 
class action in “junk faxes” case). This is a perverse result given that, as several 
commentators have noted, it is attorneys who are most likely to benefit from class 
action settlements where the plaintiffs have little stake in the matter. By contrast, in 
health-related cases, class actions present the opportunity for meaningful redress for 
plaintiffs. 
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significant (though often unrecognized) role. In Castano v. 
American Tobacco Co., a class action brought on behalf of 
addicted smokers, this concern was clearly central to the 
court’s decision.177 Basing their case on newly revealed evidence 
that tobacco companies had been manipulating nicotine levels 
in cigarettes in order to create and sustain addiction, the 
plaintiffs focused their lawsuit on the tobacco companies’ fraud, 
rather than on the health effects of smoking.178 In this way, they 
hoped to avoid some of the “commonality” questions that had 
doomed previous attempts at class actions. Although the 
district court certified the class (with respect to whether the 
industry had defrauded the plaintiffs and whether punitive 
damages were warranted), the Fifth Circuit reversed, relying 
heavily on Rhone-Poulenc.179 Characterizing the plaintiffs’ claim 
as a “novel and wholly untested theory,” the Fifth Circuit wrote 
that the case presented unique concerns: 
[C]lass [action] certification creates insurmountable pressure on 
defendants to settle, whereas individual trials would not . . . . These 
settlements have been referred to as judicial blackmail. 
The traditional concern over the rights of defendants in mass tort 
class actions is magnified in the instant case. . . . This is because 
certification of an immature tort results in a higher than normal risk 
that the class action may not be superior to individual 
adjudication.180 
This deference for “the rights of defendants” does not 
appear anywhere in Rule 23. Nonetheless, there is no reason 
not to take the Fifth Circuit’s statements at face value when it 
expressed its concern that class action certification might 
unfairly force the tobacco industry to either settle (regardless of 
meritorious defenses it might have) or “roll the dice” on one 
massive trial. The stakes involved were indeed huge.181 The 
plaintiffs were a class of roughly 40 million people in what was 
  
 177 See 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 178 See Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51 
DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 333 (2001) [hereinafter Rabin, Tentative Assessment]. 
 179 Castano, 84 F.3d at 746, 748. 
 180 Id. at 737, 746-47 (footnote omitted). For a rebuttal to the charge of 
“judicial blackmail,” see Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification 
and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003). 
 181 See Richard L. Marcus, Reassessing the Magnetic Pull of Megacases on 
Procedure, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 484 (2001) (“Had the plaintiffs succeeded in 
preserving class certification in Castano . . . the availability of the class device itself 
would have been a generating factor behind litigation of almost unimaginable 
dimensions.”). 
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quite possibly “the largest class action ever attempted in 
federal court.”182 Even without seeking health-related damages, 
the economic damages and punitive damages could plausibly 
have bankrupted the tobacco industry. Given the 
circumstances, it is not at all surprising that the Fifth Circuit 
was reluctant to allow a “winner-takes-all shootout at the OK 
Corral.”183 
Judge Posner, as noted above, had suggested in Rhone-
Poulenc that individual treatment might be appropriate where 
“individual suits are infeasible because the claim of each class 
member is tiny relative to the expense of litigation.”184 The Fifth 
Circuit determined that Castano was not such a case, but its 
conclusion that “individual suits are feasible” proved to be 
mistaken.185 In fact, individual plaintiffs have not been able to 
afford lawsuits based on Castano’s addiction-focused theory. 
The Castano plaintiffs’ attorneys’ threat that they would 
“inundate the courts with individual claims if class certification 
is denied” was revealed to be idle bluster.186 Thus, in retrospect, 
Castano’s reliance on Rhone-Poulenc was arguably misplaced. 
Nonetheless, by loosening the conditions under which Rhone-
Poulenc’s “blackmail” theory would be applied, the Fifth Circuit 
made it easier for subsequent cases to further unmoor Rhone-
Poulenc’s holding from Judge Posner’s articulated limitations. 
Myriam Gilles writes: 
The Castano decertification was followed, in quick succession, by the 
Sixth Circuit’s decertification of a class involving penile implants, 
the Ninth Circuit’s decertification of medical products liability 
classes, and the Third Circuit’s decertification of an asbestos class. 
Finally, the Supreme Court got into the act [in Amchem Prods. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)], rejecting a prepackaged settlement 
deal in which plaintiffs and defendants agreed to certify an asbestos 
class for settlement purposes only. Once again, the refusal to certify 
  
 182 Castano, 84 F.3d at 737; Rabin, Tentative Assessment, supra note 178, at 
333. 
 183 Gilles, supra note 169, at 387.  
 184 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 185 Castano, 84 F.3d at 748. Thus, Castano may have been the unusual case 
where the individual damages were not significant enough to support individual 
lawsuits, but class certification created a case so large it could have destroyed the 
industry. 
 186 Id. Following the decertification of Castano, some individual lawsuits 
against the tobacco industry have succeeded, but the successful claims have not been 
based upon the addiction-based theory put forward in Castano. See Robert L. Rabin, 
Tobacco Control Strategies: Past Efficacy and Future Promise, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1721, 1742-44 (2008) (surveying recent individual lawsuits against the tobacco 
industry).  
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was driven, in part, by concerns with “fairness” to the defendants, 
given the coercive settlement power of a certified class proceeding.187  
More recent cases have similarly relied on Castano to 
deny class certification in lawsuits involving allegedly defective 
pharmaceuticals,188 exposure to radiation,189 welding fumes,190 
and toxic chemical leaks.191 In most of these cases (with the 
exception of the asbestos cases), the discrepancy in power 
between the parties and/or the stakes involved would not have 
exerted undue pressure on the defendants to either settle the 
case or risk bankruptcy. Thus, the reasoning behind Rhone-
Poulenc and Castano was inapplicable. Nonetheless, cases 
following Castano have ignored the context of the case and 
focused instead on its holding or its ancillary concerns about 
commonality.  
Several subsequent tobacco cases have followed 
Castano, thus setting additional precedents making class 
action certification more difficult in health-related cases. 
Overreaching by plaintiffs’ attorneys—as in the recent case of 
McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., which sought $800 
billion in damages for a massive class consisting of all “light” 
cigarette smokers since 1971—has not helped.192 In the notable 
Engle case in Florida, a Miami jury awarded a class of Florida 
smokers $145 billion in punitive damages against the tobacco 
industry.193 Though the Florida Supreme Court later decertified 
the class on “commonality” grounds,194 it is likely that the 
court’s decision was also due in part to astonishment at the size 
of the jury verdict and concern about unfairness to the tobacco 
  
 187 Gilles, supra note 169, at 387-88 (citations omitted). 
 188 Blain v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 240 F.R.D. 179, 190-91 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 189 Norwood v. Raytheon Co., 237 F.R.D. 581, 602-05 (W.D. Tex. 2006). 
 190 In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 245 F.R.D. 279, 306 (N.D. Ohio 2007). 
 191 Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 604-05 (5th Cir. 
2006). In all, Castano has been cited by more than 600 cases. Some of these have 
focused on Castano’s remarkably broad statement that “a fraud class action cannot be 
certified when individual reliance will be an issue.” Castano, 84 F.3d at 745. 
 192 See 522 F.3d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 2008). In McLaughlin, District Judge Jack 
Weinstein, who had helped originate the mass tort class action with his decision in In 
re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 857-58 (E.D.N.Y. 
1984), granted class certification before being reversed by the Second Circuit. Schwab 
v. Philip Morris USA, 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 193 Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1254 (Fla. 2006). 
 194 Id. at 1268 (writing that “individualized issues such as legal causation, 
comparative fault, and damages predominate”). 
48 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1 
companies.195 The suspicion that the Florida Supreme Court 
was more troubled by the outcome than the procedure is 
heightened by the fact that the court had previously refused 
the defendants’ request to decertify the class before the trial.  
In leading the decline of the class action in health-
related cases, tobacco cases have been joined by asbestos cases. 
With respect to class action certification, asbestos cases share 
the salient characteristics of tobacco litigation: extremely large 
numbers of potential plaintiffs who present widely varied 
medical conditions and histories of exposure. In Amchem, the 
Supreme Court decertified a settlement class action in an 
asbestos case, noting the same problems highlighted in 
Castano. It highlighted the massive size of the proposed class, 
and it emphasized that courts must exercise caution when 
“individual stakes are high and disparities among class 
members great.”196 This was followed by the rejection of an 
asbestos-related class action settlement two years later in Ortiz 
v. Fibreboard Corp., where the Court again signaled its 
distaste for the use of class action settlements to resolve mass 
tort cases.197 
Thus, it was perhaps not the “tobacco-ness” of the 
tobacco cases that led to their decertification, but rather a set 
of characteristics common to both tobacco and asbestos 
litigation. Together, these two types of cases have created 
precedents in nearly every circuit that can be seized upon to 
decertify mass tort class actions. These cases have precipitated 
the collapse of the class action as a public health tool, even 
though the unusual features of tobacco and asbestos litigation 
are absent in many other public health contexts.  
E. Punitive Damages 
Because tobacco companies have historically been so 
successful in defending against liability, tobacco-related cases 
contributed nothing to the law of punitive damages until 
recently. Indeed, it was not until 2005, in Henley v. Philip 
Morris, that a tobacco industry defendant actually made a 
payment of punitive damages to a plaintiff in a personal injury 
  
 195 Id. at 1265 n.8 (“We also conclude that the punitive damages award was 
clearly excessive . . . . [T]he award would result in an unlawful crippling of the 
defendant companies.”). 
 196 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624-25 (1997). 
 197 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999). 
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lawsuit.198 Over the last ten years, however, the tobacco 
companies have begun to face more adverse judgments that 
have included awards of punitive damages. In keeping with 
their reputation as tenacious litigators, the tobacco companies 
have consistently pursued every possible avenue to appeal 
these verdicts and delay paying claims.199 This strategy—
though not always successful in vacating damages awards—
has often worked (as it did in Henley) to significantly reduce 
the amount of punitive damages.200 It has also meant that 
tobacco cases are more frequently the subject of precedent-
making decisions involving punitive damages awards—
particularly in cases interpreting the Supreme Court’s rapidly-
shifting Due Process jurisprudence on the topic.  
The use of tobacco-related cases to set new precedents 
can have unintended consequences that severely limit the 
availability of punitive damages for subsequent litigants. For 
example, in Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., the 
Eighth Circuit slashed an Arkansas jury’s award of punitive 
damages by two-thirds, finding that a 1:1 ratio between 
compensatory and punitive damages was appropriate.201 The 
court, astoundingly, concluded that despite clear evidence that 
American Tobacco (a predecessor company to Brown & 
Williamson) “actively misled consumers about the health risks 
associated with smoking,” there was “no evidence that anyone 
at American Tobacco intended to victimize its customers.”202 It 
is easy to see how all sorts of defendants—in other public 
health contexts and beyond—could subsequently argue that 
punitive damages greater than a 1:1 ratio were not warranted 
  
 198 Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 38-39 (Ct. App. 2004), 
appeal dismissed, 97 P.3d 814 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 920 (2005).  
 199 The Henley case demonstrates the resources the tobacco industry has been 
willing to invest in appealing adverse verdicts. In 1999, a San Francisco jury awarded 
Patricia Henley $1.5 million in compensatory damages and $50 million in punitive 
damages. It was not until six years later that Philip Morris exhausted its appeals and 
was forced to pay. By that time, the case had made two trips to the California Supreme 
Court and the punitive damages awards had been slashed from $50 million to $9 
million. See Myron Levin, High Court Turns Away Philip Morris, L.A. TIMES, March 
22, 2005, at C1. 
 200 See, e.g., Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 775 (Ct. App. 
2008) (overturning award of $28 billion in punitive damages); Boeken v. Philip Morris, 
Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638 (Ct. App. 2005) (reducing punitive damages award from $3 
billion to $50 million); Philip Morris, Inc. v. French, 897 So. 2d 480, 487 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2004) (noting that in response to Philip Morris’ motion, the trial judge had 
reduced the award of damages from $5.5 million to $500,000). 
 201 394 F.3d 594, 603 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 202 Id. 
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because their conduct, however egregious, paled in comparison 
to the actions of the tobacco companies.203 
Though Boerner and cases like it can be characterized 
as (perhaps dubious) applications of the Supreme Court’s Due 
Process jurisprudence, the Supreme Court’s decision in Philip 
Morris USA v. Williams unquestionably broke new ground.204 
This decision—which has been roundly criticized by 
commentators as unintelligible205—is likely to have a significant 
impact on future public health litigation. 
1. Philip Morris USA v. Williams 
Williams involved a suit by the estate of Oregon 
resident Jesse Williams, a longtime smoker of Marlboro 
cigarettes who began smoking in the 1950s and died of 
smoking-related lung cancer in 1997. The jury found for the 
plaintiff on claims of negligence and fraud. On the fraud claim, 
the jury awarded compensatory damages of $821,000 and 
punitive damages of $79.5 million.206 After the award was 
affirmed for a second time by the Oregon Supreme Court,207 
Philip Morris appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The tobacco 
company was optimistic that the Supreme Court would apply 
its holdings in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
  
 203 See Anna Van Duzer, Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.: The 
Eighth Circuit Misapplied the Second Gore Guidepost to Erroneously Decide a Punitive 
Damages Award Was Excessive, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 387, 416, 440 (2006) (writing 
that the Boerner decision was a misapplication of both Supreme Court and Eighth 
Circuit precedent, and that “by imposing a ratio of approximately 1:1 in Boerner 
without identifying particular facts from the case that supported doing so, the court 
essentially locked in a 1:1 ratio for all future cases involving large compensatory 
awards”).  
 204 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007). 
 205 See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, Of Remedy, Juries, and State Regulation of 
Punitive Damages: The Significance of Philip Morris v. Williams, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 343, 359 (2008) (“I have read this passage scores of times. I have also taught it 
to hundreds of students in Remedies courses so far. I confess, however, to being truly 
perplexed as to how the Court envisions the jury complying with this requirement.”); 
Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and Philip Morris v. Williams, 27 REV. LITIG. 
9, 30 (2007) (“Philip Morris instructs courts that it is permissible to consider harm to 
other victims in determining reprehensibility, but impermissible to actually increase 
an award in an effort to punish the defendant for the harms inflicted on others. It is a 
distinction that many will find confusing, as the dissenting opinions noted.”).  
 206 Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). The 
jury awarded no punitive damages on the negligence claim (finding that Williams was 
fifty percent at fault); the $79.5 million in punitive damages was awarded on the fraud 
claim. The compensatory damages were later reduced by the trial judge. Id. 
 207 Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165 (Or. 2006). 
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Campbell208 and BMW of North America v. Gore209 to find that a 
nearly 100:1 ratio between punitive damages and 
compensatory damages (on the fraud claim) was 
unconstitutionally excessive. Instead, in a 5-4 decision written 
by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court avoided the question of 
excessiveness, finding alternate grounds on which to remand 
the case to the Oregon Supreme Court.210 
The Court held that “the Constitution’s Due Process 
Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to 
punish a defendant for [an] injury that it inflicts upon 
nonparties . . . those who are, essentially, strangers to the 
litigation.”211 This holding, as Justice Breyer acknowledged, was 
a new interpretation of the Due Process Clause.212 It was also 
an interpretation likely to confuse state courts, as Justice 
Breyer’s opinion further explained that evidence of harm to 
nonparties could be introduced in order to show that the 
defendant’s conduct was sufficiently “reprehensible” to justify 
an award of punitive damages. In dissent, Justice Stevens 
outlined the problem: 
[T]he majority relies on a distinction between taking third-party 
harm into account in order to assess the reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct—which is permitted—and doing so in order to 
  
 208 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 209 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 210 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 357-58 (2007). On 
remand, the Oregon Supreme Court declined to reduce or reconsider the damages 
award, finding that there had been independent state law grounds for rejecting the 
jury instruction requested by Philip Morris. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 176 P.3d 
1255, 1260 (Or. 2008), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 2904 (2008). This decision, arguably a 
“provocation to the United States Supreme Court,” led the Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari again, and in December 2008, the Supreme Court heard arguments in the 
case for the third time. Anthony J. Sebok, The Unusual Story of Williams v. Philip 
Morris, and Its Third Trip to the Supreme Court—Including Some Predictions About 
What the Court Will Do This Time, FINDLAW, Dec. 16, 2008, available at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20081216.html. However, on March 31, 2009, the 
Supreme Court unexpectedly dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. 
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009). 
 211 Williams, 549 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added). 
 212 Id. at 356-57 (“We did not previously hold explicitly that a jury may not 
punish for the harm caused by others. But we do so hold now.”). As Michael Rustad 
notes, the conclusion of Williams appears to run contrary to the Court’s previous 
statement in BMW v. Gore that “evidence that a defendant has repeatedly engaged in 
prohibited conduct while knowing or suspecting that it was unlawful would provide 
relevant support for an argument that strong medicine is required to cure the 
defendant’s disrespect for the law.” Michael L. Rustad, The Supreme Court and Me: 
Trapped in Time with Punitive Damages, 17 WIDENER L. J. 783, 820 (2008) (quoting 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576-77 (1996)).  
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punish the defendant “directly”—which is forbidden. This nuance 
eludes me.213  
The Williams decision has been characterized as just 
another step in the Supreme Court’s recent efforts to use the 
Due Process Clause to place both procedural and substantive 
limits on awards of punitive damages. To some extent, that is 
unquestionably true. Previous cases had suggested that the 
Court’s conception of damages was based on a model of “one-on-
one torts” that discounted broader social or deterrence-based 
goals that of punitive damages could serve. Williams appears 
to extend that approach, taking “further steps in limiting the 
remedial goals punitive damages could serve” with its narrow 
focus on punishment for the particular facts of the given case.214 
But were there other factors—factors unique to the tobacco-
related context of the case—that caused the Court to move its 
punitive damages jurisprudence in this particular direction? 
There are several reasons why the convoluted result of 
Williams may have been attributable to the fact that the case 
involved a smoking-related claim. First, the issue of 
assumption of risk, which has “hovered like a storm cloud over 
every smoker’s claim against the tobacco companies,”215 seems 
to have played a particularly significant role. Keith Hylton 
more specifically refers to the issue in Williams as one of 
“heterogeneity.”216 In short, the majority seemed particularly 
concerned that punishing Philip Morris for harm caused to 
other, non-plaintiff smokers would be unfair to Philip Morris 
because those other cases may have been significantly different 
(heterogeneous) from this one. Smoking-related cases raise 
these heterogeneity issues in abundance, but assumption of 
risk seems to have been of particular concern to the Court. 
Would the other, nonparty smokers have chosen to smoke 
anyway with full knowledge of the dangers? Should they be 
assigned some portion of the fault for continuing to smoke after 
the dangers of smoking were known? Justice Breyer 
highlighted this concern in his decision, writing: 
  
 213 Williams, 549 U.S. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 214 Allen, supra note 205, at 365; see Rustad, supra note 212, at 803-04 (“The 
Court’s latest decision in Philip Morris USA v. Williams was the last rites, if not the 
obituary, for the crimtort paradigm. The Court’s punitive damages cases, taken as a 
whole, are a step backward into the jurisprudence of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.” (citations omitted)). 
 215 Robert L. Rabin, Review Essay, Some Thoughts on Smoking Regulation, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 475, 493 (1991). 
 216 Hylton, supra note 205, at 19. 
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[A] defendant threatened with punishment for injuring a nonparty 
victim has no opportunity to defend against the charge, by showing, 
for example in a case such as this, that the other victim was not 
entitled to damages because he or she knew that smoking was 
dangerous or did not rely upon the defendant’s statements to the 
contrary.217 
Yet, at least in terms of public health cases, tobacco-
related cases are particularly unusual in the degree to which 
they raise the issue of assumption of risk. In many (though not 
all) public health cases, it would be absurd to argue that the 
plaintiff had voluntarily chosen to encounter the risk. For 
example, imagine a lawsuit involving a company that had 
secretly polluted the local water supply, causing hundreds of 
people to become sick. In such a case, there could be no 
argument that anyone had chosen to risk illness (unlike the 
argument that many people choose to smoke, knowing the 
risks). In such a case, “[c]omplete deterrence of the offender’s 
conduct is the socially appropriate goal . . . [and] there is no 
reason on deterrence grounds to limit aggregation [i.e., basing 
punitive damages in part on harm caused to non-parties] 
because of the problem of claim heterogeneity.”218 Thus, the fact 
that Williams was a smoking-related case may have led the 
Supreme Court to extend Due Process limitations on punitive 
damages, even though the concern raised by Philip Morris is 
inapplicable to a wide variety of other contexts.219 
Secondly, the problem identified by Philip Morris in its 
appeal—that it was being unfairly punished for acts directed to 
non-parties in the litigation—is a much more acute issue in 
tobacco cases than in other types of litigation. If juries actually 
tried to punish Philip Morris for similar harms suffered by non-
parties, the results would be astronomical awards—perhaps 
along the lines of the $145 billion punitive damages verdict in 
Engle. If Philip Morris’s conduct is generically described as 
defrauding smokers by lying about the harmfulness of 
cigarettes, there are literally millions of Oregonians who would 
have claims similar to Williams’s. The unparalleled scope of 
  
 217 Williams, 549 U.S. at 353-54. 
 218 Hylton, supra note 205, at 20. 
 219 As Hylton writes, the argument about heterogeneity would have been 
“preposterous on its face” if made by the defendant in State Farm. Id. at 21. State 
Farm could not have argued that “there were some victims of bad faith conduct in the 
insurance market that did not mind being victimized in this way at all.” Id. Yet the 
rule in Williams will operate to shield defendants like State Farm from higher punitive 
damages in the future.  
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Philip Morris’s fraud (and that of the other tobacco companies) 
created the possibility for massive punitive damages verdicts 
that would run counter to the Supreme Court’s ongoing efforts 
to rein in such awards as well as its previously-expressed 
concern (or deference to Congress’s concern) for the tobacco 
industry’s important role in the national economy.220 It seems 
that the plaintiff’s attorneys were put in a bind—in order to 
argue that it was appropriate to exceed a single-digit ratio 
between punitive and compensatory damages in this case, they 
had to emphasize the fact that Philip Morris had “engaged in 
one of the longest running, most profitable, and deadliest 
frauds in the annals of American commerce.”221 By emphasizing 
the scope of the fraud, however, they may have inadvertently 
highlighted the potential for nearly limitless punitive damages 
awards in the future. 
The Supreme Court’s attempt to finesse these two 
competing concerns—recognizing the reprehensibility of the 
tobacco industry’s conduct while at the same time protecting it 
from crippling punitive damages awards—may explain the 
Court’s decision to rule on grounds that allowed it to dodge the 
question of the single-digit ratio. The role of Justice Breyer 
may have been particularly significant. Justice Breyer has 
been a reliable vote to constrain the scope of punitive damages. 
He was in the majority in State Farm, Gore, Cooper 
Industries,222 and other cases supporting Due Process limits on 
punitive damages. At the same time, he has consistently been 
in the dissent on cases that sought to limit regulation of the 
tobacco industry, including Brown & Williamson and Lorillard 
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly. (Breyer was not on the Court when it 
decided Cipollone.) In particular, Justice Breyer’s dissent in 
Brown & Williamson went out of its way to highlight in detail 
the tobacco industry’s history of deception regarding the 
addictiveness of nicotine.223 It seems that Justice Breyer was 
reluctant to write a decision that would minimize the severity 
of the tobacco industry’s conduct, and yet he also had serious 
overarching concerns about the role of unconstrained punitive 
damages. The result was a decision in Williams that not only 
avoided addressing how Philip Morris’s conduct fit into State 
  
 220 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 138-39 (2000). 
 221 Brief for Respondent at 1, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 
(2007) (No. 05-1256). 
 222 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 425 (2001). 
 223 529 U.S. at 172-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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Farm’s suggested guideposts for punitive damages, but it also 
(unlike previous punitive damages decisions) studiously 
avoided any detailed discussion of the facts of the case.224 The 
decision reads more like a theoretical discussion that even 
avoids applying its holding to the facts of the case. Nowhere in 
the decision does Justice Breyer specifically say whether the 
jury instruction proposed by Philip Morris (which had been 
rejected) should have been accepted or what a proper jury 
instruction might look like.225 Instead, it merely provided the 
vague directive that states must “provide some form of 
protection” to ensure that punitive damages would not be used 
to punish for harm to non-parties.226 
2. Public Health Impact 
With regard to punitive damages, the impact of tobacco-
related cases, and Williams in particular, is a bit harder to 
predict. As long as the tobacco-related cases remain at the 
forefront of the justices’ minds, it is likely that at least some 
(and, for now, a majority) of the justices will decline to impose a 
hard-and-fast single-digit ratio limit on punitive damages. At 
the same time, a majority of the justices continue to have 
intellectual problems with punitive damages awards that they 
view as unpredictable, unconstrained, and unconstitutionally 
unfair. For this reason, there may be more decisions like 
Williams that attempt to split the difference but instead end up 
causing more confusion. 
Is this result better or worse than a hard-and-fast rule 
limiting punitive damages? In part, that will depend on how 
lower courts choose to apply Williams. It is certainly possible, 
however, that Williams provides the more problematic rule 
from a public health perspective. Indeed, attorneys for 
corporate defendants are optimistic that Williams may not only 
reduce punitive damages awards, but it may eliminate them 
  
 224 The entire discussion of the facts of the case is limited to three brief 
sentences. Williams, 549 U.S. at 349-50; see Heather R. Klaasen, Punishment 
Defanged: How the United States Supreme Court has Undermined the Legitimacy and 
Effectiveness of Punitive Damages [Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 
(2007)], 47 WASHBURN L.J. 551, 569 (2008) (“Even though the Court’s decisions in 
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 225 See 549 U.S. at 364 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court ventures no 
opinion on the propriety of the charge proposed by Philip Morris, though Philip Morris 
preserved no other objection to the trial proceedings.”).  
 226 Id. at 357 (majority opinion). 
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altogether. As one attorney who represents both Ford and Wal-
Mart put it, the ruling that punitive damages cannot be used to 
punish defendants for harm to non-parties “gives defendants 
not only the ability to challenge punitive[] [damages] as 
excessive but an avenue to eliminate or prevent such a verdict 
in the first place.”227 Early applications of Williams support this 
prediction. In Moody v. Ford Motor Co., for example, a U.S. 
District Court granted Ford’s motion for a new trial in a case 
involving a Ford Explorer that rolled over on the highway.228 
The driver died of asphyxia when the roof of the Explorer 
collapsed and prevented him from breathing. In granting the 
motion for a new trial, the judge suggested that after Williams, 
Oklahoma’s punitive damages statute might be facially 
unconstitutional. The statute in question provided that 
punitive damages could be awarded only if the plaintiff has 
established that the defendant “has been guilty of reckless 
disregard for the rights of others.”229 Judge Eagan wrote: 
The reckless disregard standard under Oklahoma law [Okla. Stat. 
tit. 23, § 9.1] is based on harm to others, not just harm to the 
plaintiff. . . . Under Philip Morris, Ford has a due process right to 
ensure that the jury uses punitive damages to punish it for harm 
suffered by plaintiff only, not all third parties that may have been 
injured in a rollover accident. The Court would consider a limiting 
instruction based on Philip Morris, but there is a strong possibility 
that this would be contrary to the legislative intent and may void 
any award of punitive damages under section 9.1.230 
  
 227 Margaret Cronin Fisk, Punitive Damages Shrink as Court Reins in 
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that the only legitimate function of punitive damages is a public purpose, focused on 
the impact that the misconduct has had on the public generally. See, e.g., Fabiano v. 
Philip Morris, Inc., 862 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490 (App. Div. 2008) (“A claim for punitive 
damages may, of course, be rooted in personal injury, but for such a claim to succeed 
the injury must be shown to be emblematic of much more than individually sustained 
wrong. It must be shown to reflect pervasive and grave misconduct affecting the public 
generally, to, in a sense, merge with a serious public grievance, and thus merit 
punitive, indeed quasi-criminal sanction.” (citations omitted)) (reversing award of 
punitive damages in smoking-related cases because public purpose of punishing 
tobacco industry misconduct had already been served by the payment provision of the 
Master Settlement Agreement); Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331, 343 
(Ohio 1994) (“The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate a plaintiff, but to 
punish and deter certain conduct.”). Williams provides an argument for eliminating all 
punitive damages awards in these states.  
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Even without completely barring awards of punitive 
damages, the Williams rule may prove to be more problematic 
than a hard-and-fast ratio limiting punitive damages. A ratio 
limit may be problematic in certain cases, particularly cases 
where compensatory damages are low or the misconduct was 
exceedingly profitable or hard to detect.231 The Williams 
holding, however, more directly weakens the ability of punitive 
damages to act as an effective deterrent in all mass tort cases,232 
thereby both jeopardizing public health and undercutting a 
major argument that litigation has an appropriate role to play 
in the public health context. Michael Rustad explains: 
The Court’s “other bad acts” rule of evidence will have the most 
impact in mass product liability cases where a single defect or failure 
to warn will result in a portfolio of claims. If this rule had been 
applicable in the Ford Pinto cases, evidence of other fatalities 
associated with crash-induced fuel leakage would have been 
admissible for the purposes of determining reprehensibility, but 
would not have been admissible to set the punitive damages 
award. . . . [C]orporate wrongdoers will be tempted to perform a 
socially harmful cost-benefit analysis deciding that it is profitable to 
risk the consuming public, especially where the risk of detection is 
low.233 
Thus, in mass tort cases, if juries are not allowed to consider 
the impact on non-parties when fashioning punitive damages 
awards, the defendants will almost by definition be under-
deterred (because not nearly all of those harmed by the conduct 
will bring their own lawsuits).234 Adding to this problem is the 
  
 231 See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(Posner, J.) (“If a tortfeasor is ‘caught’ only half the time he commits torts, then when 
he is caught he should be punished twice as heavily in order to make up for the times 
he gets away.”); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An 
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 874 (1998) (“When an injurer has a chance 
of escaping liability, the proper level of total damages to impose on him, if he is found 
liable, is the harm caused multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of being found 
liable.”).  
 232 See Michael L. Rustad, The Uncert-Worthiness of the Court’s Unmaking of 
Punitive Damages, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 459, 494 (2008).  
 233 Id. at 497, 500. In upholding the amount of a punitive damages award in 
one of the Ford Pinto cases, the California Appeals Court wrote that “[u]nlike malicious 
conduct directed towards a single specific individual, Ford’s tortious conduct 
endangered the lives of thousands of Pinto purchasers.” Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 
174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 388 (Ct. App. 1981). After Williams, this appears to be an invalid 
basis for upholding the size of a punitive damages award.  
 234 See Hylton, supra note 205, at 31 (“[T]he only sturdy reason that can be 
discerned for the Court’s decision [in Williams] is the notion that every person not 
before the court is capable of bringing his own lawsuit and having it decided on the 
basis of the issues in his case. While this sounds fine in theory, it is far from what 
happens in real life. The truth is that relatively few people bring lawsuits.”); Klaasen, 
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fact that companies with deep pockets—having learned from 
the model of the tobacco industry—can deter lawsuits by 
making any suit against the company an extremely expensive 
(and therefore risky) endeavor.235 Without the potential for 
punitive damages serving as an effective deterrent, there is 
little doubt that some companies will choose to endanger the 
public’s health in their pursuit of profit.236 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The legal developments catalyzed by tobacco decisions—
an expansive preemption doctrine, limits on class certification, 
and constraints on punitive damages—have severely weakened 
the ability of personal injury litigation to effectively deter 
corporate misconduct and protect public health. On the 
regulatory side, legal decisions shielding the tobacco industry 
from regulation have opened the door to weakening other 
important public health regulatory regimes. 
In many of the cases discussed above, the unusual 
context of tobacco litigation—a huge volume of cases (and 
potential cases) at the intersection of intense cultural and 
political cross-currents—may have shaped the contours of the 
decisions. These decisions then served to reshape legal 
paradigms that were subsequently applied across the field of 
public health law, even when those context-dependent 
considerations were absent. In this manner, the 
“exceptionalism” of tobacco litigation has significantly 
influenced the development of public health law. Each one of 
these doctrinal strands discussed above was clearly driven by 
other broader forces as well. Cause and effect is virtually 
impossible to establish, given the general movement of the 
courts towards more conservative positions over the time 
  
supra note 224, at 576-77 (“In fashioning an appropriate measure of deterrence, the 
jury must be allowed to consider how many other persons the defendant’s conduct 
endangered so that the jury’s interest in deterrence has an objective goal: the cost of 
the misconduct should be greater than or equal to the benefit.”). 
 235 Sara Guardino and Richard Daynard have argued that a defendant’s 
“secondary reprehensibility” in obstructing litigation should also be taken into account 
when calculating punitive damages. Guardino & Daynard, supra note 27, at 36-38. 
 236 See Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(Calabresi, J., concurring) (“When the perceived benefits of an activity accrue to the 
actor, but some significant part of the costs is borne by others, the cost-benefit analysis 
will necessarily be distorted. In such a case, the actor will have an incentive to 
undertake activities whose social costs exceed their social benefits. In other words, the 
actor will not be adequately deterred from undesirable activities. And society will 
suffer.”). 
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period examined. Nonetheless, the discussion above suggests 
that the centrality of tobacco litigation has itself been a 
significant factor influencing doctrinal development. 
The remaining question is the normative issue of how 
the courts should have addressed tobacco cases—and how they 
should do so in the future. Here, there are at least three 
options. First, one could conclude that the cases discussed 
above were simply wrongly decided and constituted 
unwarranted departures from past precedent. In Brown & 
Williamson, for example, a strong argument could be made 
that Chevron deference called for a more deferential approach 
that would have sustained the FDA’s actions. This viewpoint 
would suggest that there is no cause to treat tobacco differently 
from other products; judges should ignore the uniqueness of the 
cultural/social/political context and focus solely on the 
application of precedent. 
Second, one could argue that the tobacco cases were 
correctly decided, but were justified by their unique context 
and thus should not be applied and extended in non-tobacco 
cases. In this view, the Supreme Court may have been correct 
in denying the FDA regulatory authority over tobacco products, 
but that decision should have been viewed as a one-time 
exception to the general rules of administrative deference that 
was justified by the unique political and cultural history of 
tobacco regulation. This is essentially an argument for tobacco 
exceptionalism in the broader sense of the word; a claim that a 
unique set of rules should apply to tobacco cases. 
The third possible position is that tobacco cases are just 
one example of a type of litigation that does not fit well within 
the current public health law paradigm. When one industry 
has (allegedly) caused harm on a scale so massive that 
litigation of all claims would overwhelm the tort system and 
destroy the industry in question, the typical rules simply 
cannot be applied. Many of the legal developments discussed 
above must be seen as having occurred in the shadow of the 
“asbestos crisis” which, in the words of the Supreme Court, 
constituted an “elephantine mass [that] . . . defies customary 
judicial administration and calls for national legislation.”237 
Since far more people die from tobacco-related disease every 
year than have died from asbestos exposure in the past forty 
years, it is no wonder that the courts have looked for ways to 
  
 237 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999). 
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keep tobacco cases from overwhelming their dockets.238 
Furthermore, beyond the sheer volume of cases, others have 
argued that since “tobacco is a product bound up with a series 
of overlapping and often conflicting philosophical, economic, 
social, political and religious values,” the resolution of such a 
complex issue is properly left to the legislative process.239 Thus, 
the inability of the courts to coherently address the issue of 
tobacco may simply reflect the fact that some issues are simply 
too complex for judicial administration.240 
While both the size and the complexity of the issue of 
tobacco call out for comprehensive legislative action, this 
conclusion fails to provide any guidance as to how the courts 
should act in the interim. Congress recently passed the Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. It remains to be 
seen how effective this new Act will be in reducing tobacco-
related death and disease.241 But, as is relevant here, the Act 
does not prohibit future litigation and does not give any new 
guidance to courts as to how they should address tobacco-
related cases. Since simply rejecting jurisdiction over tobacco 
cases is not a viable option, how should the courts address 
future tobacco cases? 
A full resolution of this difficult question is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but is a ripe subject for discussion by legal 
scholars, judges, and public health experts. Indeed, the failure 
of the courts to address this issue head-on is a major source of 
the problem discussed in this Article. Instead of adopting a 
clear policy on tobacco cases—that they either will or will not 
be treated differently from other public health concerns—the 
courts have stumbled towards a third path: they purport to 
apply the law in a facially neutral manner, but the unique 
exigencies of tobacco litigation inevitably influence the 
outcomes. As a result, tobacco cases are permitted to exert an 
  
 238 Vinicius C. Antao et al., Asbestosis Mortality in the United States: Facts 
and Predictions, 66 J. OCCUP. & ENVTL. MED. 335 (2009) (finding that there were 
25,564 asbestosis deaths in the U.S. from 1968 through 2004). 
 239 Turley, supra note 23, at 435. 
 240 Cf. OREY, supra note 19, at 367 (“[U]sing individual court cases to resolve 
such a complex issue—a legal product that causes grievous harm to millions of people’s 
health when used as intended—makes no sense.”). 
 241 The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the Senate version of the 
bill (nearly identical to the final Act) would reduce youth smoking by eleven percent 
over the next decade, and would reduce adult smoking by two percent over the same 
period. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE, S. 
982, FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10254/s982.pdf. 
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outsized and troublesome influence on the rest of public health 
law. 
Until these questions are resolved, tobacco litigation 
will likely continue to produce anomalous outcomes driven by 
the unusual pressures of smoking-related cases. Just like the 
cigarettes themselves, tobacco-related decisions should come 
with a warning label: CAUTION: MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO 
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW. 
